Getting the Better of the Bargain: Technical Intelligence, Arms Sales, and Anglo-Israeli Relations 1967–1974

Abstract

This analysis explores the nature of Anglo-Israeli intelligence relations between 1967 and 1974, focusing in particular on how the legacy of the British mandate in Palestine, the influence of senior British diplomats, as well as wider commercial interests shaped attempts by intelligence officials on both sides to move this relationship beyond the purely functional. Whilst Israel looked to barter access to recently captured Soviet equipment for greater collaboration with the British in weapons development and arms sales, London demurred. Despite the urging of some in Whitehall, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office limited any collaboration to functional exchanges and kept them firmly in the shadows. The aftermath of the October 1973 war revealed the price paid by Britain. With Israel now dependent on Washington for the bulk of its military equipment, London's ability to exercise any influence over Tel Aviv in reaching an accommodation with its Arab neighbours diminished greatly.Reciprocity has defined some of the closest intelligence relationships between democratic states. Not only are such relationships functional in terms of the intelligence shared and distributed but equally, shared norms, values, and even cultures that allow more junior partners to benefit exponentially inform them for the most part. They are so much more than utilitarian arrangements and, as such, have a durability, indeed longevity, which can and does survive periodic friction when political masters fall out. 1 It has often been noted, for example, that intelligence liaison and co-operation between Britain and the United States has allowed London to exercise influence in Washington's corridors of power that its otherwise diminished status as a global Power would have denied. 2 Equally, the 'Five Eyes' alliance, an Anglophone intelligence consortium pooling the signals and electronic capabilities of Australia, Britain, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States is perhaps the most notable example of an intelligence alliance built on shared cultural and political norms as well as common security interests. 3