Getting a lot out of a little bit of work? The effects of marginal employment during unemployment

Eppel, Rainer; Mahringer, Helmut

doi:10.1007/s10663-018-9402-1

Cited by 2 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 54 publications

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“…There is a disregard in several U.S. states, in Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Germany, Luxembourg, Poland. focused on European countries, rely on the timing-of-events approach (Abbring and Van Den Berg (2003)) or matching methods. They look at the effects of working on non-regular jobs on the access to regular employment in Austria ( Böheim and Weber (2011), Eppel and Mahringer (2019), Belgium (Cockx et al (2013)), Denmark (Kyyrä et al (2013)), Finland (Kyyrä (2010)), France (Fremigacci and Terracol (2013), Auray and Lepage-Saucier (2021)), Germany (Caliendo et al (2012)), Norway (Godøy and Røed (2016)), Slovakia (Van Ours (2004)), Switzerland (Gerfin et al (2005)). They find mixed results, showing generally significant lock-in effects while individuals work on non-regular jobs and more positive effects on the access to regular jobs after non-regular jobs end.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Lock-In Effects of Part-Time Unemployment Benefits

2021

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We ran a large randomized controlled experiment among about 150,000 recipients of unemployment benefits insurance in France in order to evaluate the impact of part-time unemployment benefits. We took advantage of the lack of knowledge of job seekers regarding this program and sent emails presenting the program. The information provision had a significant positive impact on the propensity to work while on claim, but reduced the unemployment exit rate, showing important lock-in effects into unemployment associated with part-time unemployment benefits. The importance of these lock-in effects implies that increasing the marginal tax rate on earnings from work while on claim in the neighborhood of its current level would not decrease labor supply and would decrease the expenditure net of taxes of the unemployment insurance agency.

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