Geteilte Gefühle? Überlegungen zur Sozialität des Geistes

Demmerling, Christoph

doi:10.1515/9783110349955.21

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“…In response to this problem, several authors have taken what we might call a phenomenological turn in the philosophy of emotion (Goldie 2000;Helm 2001;Ratcliffe 2008;Slaby 2008;Slaby et al 2011;Schmid 2014bSchmid , 2016Demmerling 2014). Their main claim is that in the case of affective intentionality, the intentional and the phenomenal aspects of a mental state or episode cannot be separated.…”

Section: Cognitivist Accountsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Shared emotions: a Steinian proposal

Thonhauser

2018

Phenom Cogn Sci

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The aim of this paper is to clarify the notion of shared emotion. After contextualizing this notion within the broader research landscape on collective affective intentionality, I suggest that we reserve the term shared emotion to an affective experience that is phenomenologically and functionally ours: we experience it together as our emotion, and it is also constitutively not mine and yours, but ours. I focus on the three approaches that have dominated the philosophical discussion on shared emotions: cognitivist accounts, concern-based accounts, and phenomenological fusion accounts. After identifying strengths and weaknesses of these approaches and summarizing the elements that a multifaceted theory of shared emotions requires, I turn to the work of the early phenomenologist Edith Stein to further advance an approach to shared emotions that combines the main strengths of Helm and Salmela's concern-based accounts and Schmid's phenomenological fusion account. According to this proposal, the sharedness of a shared emotion cannot be located in one element, but rather consists in a complex of interrelated features.Keywords Shared emotions . Collective emotions . Affective intentionality . Communal experience . Edith Stein The last decade has seen an emerging debate about the possibility and nature of shared or collective emotions.1 As yet, however, there has been no agreement over precisely what these labels refer to. The aim of this paper is to clarify the notion of shared emotions. Following a preliminary definition, which contextualizes the debate on shared emotions within the broader research landscape on collective affective intentionality, I will discuss three major approaches to shared emotions in contemporary philosophical debate. After identifying shortcomings in these approaches and summarizing the elements that need to be accounted for in a multifaceted theory of shared emotions, I will turn to Edith Stein to introduce several suggestions from early phenomenology that can improve current theorizing on shared emotions.

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Section: Cognitivist Accountsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Sánchez Guerrero, for instance, affirms that when we share an emotion, this actually means that we share the underlying import in such a way that it is a similar basis for our individual emotions (Sánchez Guerrero 2011; cf. also Demmerling 2014). He states this in a critical discussion of Schmid's (2008) phenomenological fusion account.…”

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confidence: 94%

Shared emotions: a Steinian proposal

Thonhauser

2018

Phenom Cogn Sci

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Geteilte Gefühle? Überlegungen zur Sozialität des Geistes

Cited by 1 publication

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Shared emotions: a Steinian proposal

Shared emotions: a Steinian proposal

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