German Military Influence in Argentina, 1921–1940

Atkins, G. Pope; Thompson, Larry V.

doi:10.1017/s0022216x00002078

Cited by 5 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 2 publications

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“…Throughout Argentina's modern history, the army held a key position inside this system, repeatedly intervened in politics, and ousted several democratically elected governments (Potash 1996). Despite these interventions, the army's recruitment, training, and promotion system resembled a prototypical security organization with a hierarchical and meritocratic structure (Atkins and Thompson 1972). 11 With an up-or-out system in place, military officers faced considerable career pressures from the outset.…”

Section: Argentina's Coercive Systemmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Why Underachievers Dominate Secret Police Organizations: Evidence from Autocratic Argentina

Scharpf

Gläßel

2019

American J Political Sci

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Autocrats depend on a capable secret police. Anecdotal evidence, however, often characterizes agents as surprisingly mediocre in skill and intellect. To explain this puzzle, this article focuses on the career incentives underachieving individuals face in the regular security apparatus. Low-performing officials in hierarchical organizations have little chance of being promoted or filling lucrative positions. To salvage their careers, these officials are willing to undertake burdensome secret police work. Using data on all 4,287 officers who served in autocratic Argentina (1975-83), we study biographic differences between secret police agents and the entire recruitment pool. We find that low-achieving officers were stuck within the regime hierarchy, threatened with discharge, and thus more likely to join the secret police for future benefits. The study demonstrates how state bureaucracies breed mundane career concerns that produce willing enforcers and cement violent regimes. This has implications for the understanding of autocratic consolidation and democratic breakdown. Replication Materials: The data and materials required to verify the computational reproducibility of the results, procedures and analyses in this article are available on the American Journal of Political Science Dataverse within the Harvard Dataverse Network, at: https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/PGFOXW. "We don't want clever people. We want mediocrities."-Officer, Greek Military Police 1 A utocracies are notorious for their systematic violation of civil liberties and human rights (e.g., Davenport 2007; Frantz and Kendall-Taylor 2014; Valentino 2004). At the core of autocratic repression stand secret police forces (Arendt 2017; Friedrich and Brzezinski 1965). For centuries, regimes have made extensive use of and largely depended on the loyalty of such organizations (Baldwin 1934; Greitens 2016; Plate and Darvi 1982). Charged with the responsibility to protect the regime from internal and external threats, secret

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Section: Argentina's Coercive Systemmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Argentina is an ethnically and religiously homogeneous society. From 1890 to 1940, Prussian military advisors professionalized the Argentine army, turning it into a merit-based organization (Atkins and Thompson 1972). Explanations based on favoritism are therefore unlikely to confound our analysis.…”

Section: Internal Validitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Why Underachievers Dominate Secret Police Organizations: Evidence from Autocratic Argentina

Scharpf

Gläßel

2019

American J Political Sci

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“Technical, not Political”: The Military Professional as the Citizen-Soldier

Viana

2022

Post-Conflict Colombia and the Global Circulation of Military Expertise

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Moderating Diffusion: Military Bureaucratic Politics and the Implementation of German Doctrine in South America, 1885–1914

Grauer¹

2015

World Pol.

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How do military ideas, and military doctrines in particular, spread through the international system? This article extends extant work on military diffusion by exploring why some states, after deciding to adopt another's innovative warfighting system, fail to implement it. The author argues that for states to successfully implement a military doctrine developed abroad, much information about the unobservable aspects of the warfighting system is needed. States vary in their capacity to acquire the necessary knowledge because they face differing levels of resistance to military diffusion within their armed forces. Powerful groups within the military that are opposed to such adoptions are likely to use their influence to press for policies and bureaucratic maneuvers that constrain information flows between innovating states and their own state and consequently inhibit implementation and diffusion of military doctrines. Therefore successful implementation of foreign military doctrines can be expected when states face minimal resistance within their militaries, and moderated or failed implementation can be expected when opposition is more significant. A provisional test of the argument is conducted through an assessment of Argentina, Brazil, and Chile's attempts to implement the German military doctrine at the turn of the twentieth century.

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German Military Influence in Argentina, 1921–1940

Cited by 5 publications

References 2 publications

Why Underachievers Dominate Secret Police Organizations: Evidence from Autocratic Argentina

Why Underachievers Dominate Secret Police Organizations: Evidence from Autocratic Argentina

“Technical, not Political”: The Military Professional as the Citizen-Soldier

Moderating Diffusion: Military Bureaucratic Politics and the Implementation of German Doctrine in South America, 1885–1914

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