Geopolitics, water and development in South Asia: cooperative development in the Ganges–Brahmaputra delta

Abstract

In light of the new cooperative water development agreements in South Asia since 1996 and, in particular, the 1996 Ganges Waters Treaty between India and Bangladesh, this paper explores the geopolitical obstacles to cooperation between states in the joint development of large‐scale river systems and current opportunities for successful development. The general problems of cooperation faced by the riparian states which share successive rivers are examined with reference to the geopolitical obstacles to cooperation in the Bengal delta since the Partition of the Indian subcontinent through which India and Pakistan gained Independence as separate states in 1947. Against the background of repeated attempts to resolve water‐sharing issues between India and East Pakistan and its successor state, Bangladesh, this paper concludes that for cooperation to succeed contemporary large‐scale river development has to meet a wide range of criteria which go beyond conventional engineering or economic cost‐benefit analyses to include geopolitical criteria. These range from global‐scale environmental concerns to micro‐scale issues of mutual regional benefit. This paper proposes a major new development on the Brahmaputra and Ganges which the authors argue could break the log‐jam of a zero‐sum game approach to surface water development in the Bengal delta. Unlike most large‐scale dam‐building proposals, the barrage construction outlined would cause negligible population displacement, and making maximum use of existing river channels would minimize the environmental impacts associated with the large canal or dam construction envisaged in earlier Ganges–Brahmaputra–Meghna (GBM) schemes. Yet the paper also recognizes that while such a proposal could bring economic, environmental and political advantages to all users in the GBM basin, new thinking on the management of international rivers is less in favour of supply‐side solutions, and the case would need to be substantiated by detailed evaluation.

Managing international river basins: reviewing India–Bangladesh transboundary water issues

“…Embankments should be built to prevent flooding of urban areas or some districts that have higher agricultural loss due to flooding. 5 Instead, a network of barrages that includes water from the Ganges and Brahmaputra and integrates Farraka Barrage has been suggested in one study (Brichieri-Colombi and Bradnock 2003). Integrated approach, with multi-national cooperation, could help Nepal develop a hydroelectric capability, help India transfer water from Brahmaputra and help Bangladesh build effective barrages (Shibusawa 1987).…”

Political history of Farakka Barrage and its effects on environment in Bangladesh

“…This flow of 70,000 cusecs is exceeded 60 per cent of the time in the dry season, based on the 1949-88 measurements of flows arriving at Farakka. Thus for 40 per cent of the dry season period covered by the treaty, the flows are shared equally (Brichieri-Colombi and Bradnock 2003). If the flow falls below 50,000 cusecs, the two Governments will enter into immediate consultations to make adjustments on an emergency basis, in accordance with the principles of equity, fair play and no harm to either party (Bangladesh India Water Sharing Treaty 1996).…”

“…In this case the groundwater is being used over there and as a result the navigation depths are reducing due to polder construction in many rivers. In the true sense almost every problem in the country associated with water has been attributed to the impact of Farakka (Brichieri-Colombi and Bradnock 2003). This is discernible that the very social, economic and environmental problems have become part and parcel to the Bangladeshi people which are gradually accelerated due to withdrawals of Ganges waters at Farakka.…”

The Ganges Basin management and community empowerment

“…However, the treaty fails to set out guidelines for flooding, drought, and river bank erosion (Bhattarai 2009;Brichieri-Colombi and Bradnock 2003). The treaty also fails to recognize the JRC as a main water management body.…”