Geopolitics and international organizations: An empirical study on IMF facilities

Reynaud, Julien; Vauday, Julien

doi:10.1016/j.jdeveco.2008.07.005

“…This is evidenced by countries receiving favorable treatment from the Fund if they are politically close to the United States, geopolitically important, members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), or cast votes in line with the Fund's major shareholders in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) and in the UNSC (Dreher and Jensen 2007;Reynaud and Vauday 2009;Stone 2008;Thacker 1999;Vreeland and Dreher 2014). Countries that are indebted to U.S. commercial banks also receive benefits (Broz and Hawes 2006;Copelovitch 2010;Gould 2003).…”

Section: Hypothesesmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Economics of the Democratic Deficit: The Effect of IMF Programs on Inequality

Lang

¹

2016

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. www.econstor.eu Terms of use: Documents in

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“…While extensive literature exists on the determinants of aid allocation by the traditional Western (DAC) donors (Alesina & Dollar, 2000;Alesina & Weder, 2002;Dreher, Sturm, & Vreeland, 2009;Fleck & Kilby, 2006, 2010Kuziemko & Werker, 2006;Neumayer, 2003aNeumayer, , 2005Reynaud & Vauday, 2009), studies that have empirically examined the determinants of aid allocation by emerging donors is surprisingly sparse. With the arrival of better availability of foreign data for emerging donors, some scholars have recently started to analyse the aid allocation of non-DAC donors using quantitative estimation methods.…”

Section: Rise Of Development Finance From Non-dac Donorsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Do authoritarian regimes receive more Chinese development finance than democratic ones? Empirical evidence for Africa

Broich

¹

2017

China Economic Review

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This study is part of an emerging literature that aims to shed light on China's development finance activities in Africa using quantitative estimation techniques. This paper empirically investigates whether African authoritarian regimes receive more Chinese development assistance than democratic ones, both in absolute and relative terms. I use three different measures of democracy/autocracy which allows me to check whether my results depend on the specific indicator chosen. The OLS results suggest that Chinese development finance does not systematically flow to more authoritarian countries, controlling for strategic, economic, political, institutional and geographic confounding factors. The results are not driven by the specific democracy indicator used in the analysis. The findings remain virtually unchanged if I reduce the sample to Sub-Saharan Africa only. Furthermore, the results stand up to several robustness checks, including FE, RE and instrumental variable estimation.

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“…But while the literature has suggested various political factors that may influence the decision-making process on IMF loans, there is little agreement on which political variables to include. For instance Dreher et al (2009) and Reynaud and Vauday (2009) From our literature research we conclude that one political variable stands out of the numerous political variables tested in recent studies in terms of frequency used and its explanatory power. Therefore, we include this variable in each of our models and consider an additional 14 political variables in our robustness analysis.…”

mentioning

confidence: 70%

Explaining IMF lending decisions after the Cold War

Moser

¹

,

Sturm

²

2011

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. analysis, suggest that some economic and political variables are robustly related to these two dimensions of IMF program decisions. Furthermore, we show that it is important to distinguish between concessional and non-concessional IMF loans. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may

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Geopolitics and international organizations: An empirical study on IMF facilities

Cited by 44 publications

References 54 publications

The Economics of the Democratic Deficit: The Effect of IMF Programs on Inequality

The Economics of the Democratic Deficit: The Effect of IMF Programs on Inequality

Do authoritarian regimes receive more Chinese development finance than democratic ones? Empirical evidence for Africa

Explaining IMF lending decisions after the Cold War

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