The Cambridge History of Russia 2006
DOI: 10.1017/chol9780521815291.005
|View full text |Cite
|
Sign up to set email alerts
|

Geographies of imperial identity

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...
2
2
1

Citation Types

0
5
0
1

Year Published

2014
2014
2019
2019

Publication Types

Select...
3
2
2

Relationship

0
7

Authors

Journals

citations
Cited by 14 publications
(6 citation statements)
references
References 170 publications
0
5
0
1
Order By: Relevance
“…One motive for Russian political and energy actors to oppose mainstream international understanding of climate change, or at least to cast serious doubts on climate change as a human-induced process, could be in both the specific interests of the energy sector in maintaining the status quo in domestic energy policy and in the general interests of Putin's regime in reducing the likelihood of criticism by the Russian people toward the hydrocarbonbased political and economic system. Furthermore, referring to the literature on identity construction based on materialities of energy in Russia (Bassin 2006;Bouzarovski and Bassin 2011;Grib 2009;Rogers 2012; see also Rutland 2015), we find that climate denial discourse in Russia could be strategically used to strengthen a national identity constructed on the notion of Russia as a 'hydrocarbon giant' or 'energy superpower'. As noted by the abovementioned scholars, there is the wish of the leadership to strengthen the role of hydrocarbons as the basis for Russia's Great Power status.…”
Section: Denial Discourse (Re)contextualizedmentioning
confidence: 65%
“…One motive for Russian political and energy actors to oppose mainstream international understanding of climate change, or at least to cast serious doubts on climate change as a human-induced process, could be in both the specific interests of the energy sector in maintaining the status quo in domestic energy policy and in the general interests of Putin's regime in reducing the likelihood of criticism by the Russian people toward the hydrocarbonbased political and economic system. Furthermore, referring to the literature on identity construction based on materialities of energy in Russia (Bassin 2006;Bouzarovski and Bassin 2011;Grib 2009;Rogers 2012; see also Rutland 2015), we find that climate denial discourse in Russia could be strategically used to strengthen a national identity constructed on the notion of Russia as a 'hydrocarbon giant' or 'energy superpower'. As noted by the abovementioned scholars, there is the wish of the leadership to strengthen the role of hydrocarbons as the basis for Russia's Great Power status.…”
Section: Denial Discourse (Re)contextualizedmentioning
confidence: 65%
“…109 The paper highlighted three main facts. First, it identified a blind-spot in the common narrative of the expansion of EIS, arguing that a standard of civilisation did not exist only between 'the West and the rest', but also within the 'West' itself.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 95%
“…A deeper understanding of the wider historical context where Russia operated, particularly in the years immediately after the Crimean War, revealed not that Russia was outside EIS, but certainly that it was situated in a peripheral tie, and was not seen as fully conforming to the European standard of civilisation: 'European Russia retained its superiority relative to its Asiatic colonies, but rather than standing at one with the West, Russia was seen instead to occupy an intermediary position between the two'. 109 The paper highlighted three main facts. First, it identified a blind-spot in the common narrative of the expansion of EIS, arguing that a standard of civilisation did not exist only between 'the West and the rest', but also within the 'West' itself.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 95%
See 2 more Smart Citations