Geographic Politics in the U.S. House of Representatives: Coalition Building and Distribution of Benefits

Abstract

This article argues that scholars need to consider the structure of House representation to better understand distributive politics. Because House districts (unlike states) are not administrative units in the federal system, House members cannot effectively claim credit for most grant-in-aid funds. Instead, their best credit-claiming opportunities lie in earmarked projects, a small fraction of federal grant dollars. As a consequence, I expect to find: (1) political factors have a much greater effect on the distribution of earmarked projects than on federal funds generally; and (2) project grants are a better support-building tool for coalition leaders than allocations to states. I test this argument with a study of the 1998 reauthorization of surface transportation programs and find strong support for both hypotheses.

Distributive Politics and Voter Turnout

“…New grants are likely to receive more attention from both representatives and constituents and therefore have a larger impact on the decisions to vote in elections, in comparison to continuing grants. 9 Second, we exclude all grants awarded to a state government since they provide no information to identify for which district the money is actually spent and generate no opportunity for legislators to claim credit in their districts (Lee, 2003). Third, we exclude loans and insurance programs from our analysis since they may not necessarily generate distributive benefits (Stein & Bickers, 1995).…”

Assessing Local Capacity for Federal Grant-Getting

“…In other words, the majority party is expected to aid its own members, and particularly those in competitive districts. The majority party enjoys a solid advantage in distributing project dollars (Lee, 2003). Yet, according to Balla, Lawrence, Maltzman, and Sigelman (2002), the minority party is not cut out completely, but receives a smaller share of the pie, to inoculate the majority party from claims of wasteful spending.…”

“…According to Lee (2003), majority party members-those members who are of the same party in control of the House-should not view minority party members as full partners in distribution of federal funds. In other words, the majority party is expected to aid its own members, and particularly those in competitive districts.…”

Does Presidential Primary and Caucus Order Affect Policy? Evidence from Federal Procurement Spending

“…These borrow heavily from other analyses of distributive spending patterns, notably, Taylor's (2008) analysis. The literature suggests the need for congressional controls, and I use four Stein 2000, 2004;Lee 2003;Lowry and Potoski 2004;Rundquist and Carsey 2002;Stein and Bickers 1995). They capture the proportion of a state's House and Senate delegation that is seated on the House and Senate Appropriations and Armed Services committees.…”