Gentrification as a Governmental Strategy: Social Control and Social Cohesion in Hoogvliet, Rotterdam

Abstract

In the Netherlands, state actors and housing associations ambitiously pursue a project of state-led gentrification in disadvantaged neighbourhoods. The state induces housing associations and seduces private developers to invest in the construction of middleclass, owner-occupied housing in disadvantaged urban neighbourhoods with many low-cost social rented dwellings. Researchers refer to this form of government intervention as`urban restructuring' (Kleinhans, 2003; MVROM, 1997;2000;van Kempen and Priemus, 1999). Even though Dutch housing policy is subject to constant revision, it is clear that, over the next two decades, hundreds of neighbourhoods will experience such restructuring. First of all, this means that the share of social rented housing in the neighbourhoods designated for restructuring will decline from around 62% in the year 2000 to 45% in the year 2010. National and local state agencies, together with housing associations, are responsible for urban restructuring that aims to improve the economic appeal as well as the`liveability' of designated neighbourhoods (see Tunstall, 2003). In the discourse about this policy, a`liveable neighbourhood' refers to à balanced' neighbourhood with a low level of crime and a sizeable share of middleclass households. It does not refer to a neighbourhood where government agencies develop policies to ameliorate the social conditions of the most disadvantaged groups.Restructuring policy attempts to promote gentrification in even the most disadvantaged and peripheral boroughs of Dutch cities. As we will show, however, conventional explanations of gentrification do not fully explain the scope, scale, and form of the processes involved. In the absence of profit motives or significant consumer demand, why do Dutch state actors and housing associations promote gentrification? Our response will focus on the institutional networks that promote it and on the discourse

State-led Gentrification and the Changing Geography of Market-oriented Housing Policies

“…Particularly in the Dutch welfare state, tenure mixing policies have traditionally formed an important means to disperse poverty concentrations in order to mitigate potential negative neighbourhood effects (Galster 2012) and to manage disadvantaged neighbourhoods (Uitermark, Duyvendak, and Kleinhans 2007). Yet, austerity and the transition towards financially more restricted housing associations have made it more difficult to engage in costly urban renewal to alter the tenure and social mix of disadvantaged neighbourhoods (cf.…”

“…The introduction of middle class households that are generally supportive of state policies is supposed to make neighbourhoods easier to manage and amenable to government interventions. Social mixing thus becomes a strategy to ensure or bring back social order and control over deviant spaces (Uitermark, Duyvendak, and Kleinhans 2007). Such policies of social mixing through tenure restructuring therefore take place in areas where poverty concentrations exist and the negative effects of segregation seem most visible.…”

“…Tenure mixing policies typically entail the introduction of more expensive owner occupied dwellings and more affluent residents to targeted neighbourhoods, frequently at the cost of affordable rental housing for lower income tenants. These policies may therefore be considered part of state-led gentrification (Smith 2002;Uitermark, Duyvendak, and Kleinhans 2007;Lees 2008;Bridge, Butler, and Lees 2012). State policies may amplify already existing gentrification processes, or alternatively seek to spark gentrification in disadvantaged neighbourhoods.…”

Urban renewal without displacement? Belgium’s ‘housing contract experiment’ and the risks of gentrification

“…For instance, in the Netherlands, housing corporations are upgrading, demolishing and selling social housing in order to increase livability and improve a neighborhood's position within the urban system (Uitermark et al 2007). In the United States, policy programs like HOPE VI and Moving to Opportunity aim to disperse low-income households.…”

Social cohesion, social mix, and urban policies in the Netherlands

“…Jupp (1999) adds that the liveability of neighbourhoods can also be expected to improve by tenure mix, because owners are likely to complain more often to local authorities and to participate in local associations. Unfortunately, these expectations also fail to be supported by empirical evidence (Joseph et al 2007;Uitermark et al 2007).…”