Genetics and insurance in the United Kingdom 1995–2010: the rise and fall of “scientific” discrimination

Thomas, R. Guy

doi:10.1080/14636778.2012.662046

Cited by 10 publications

(9 citation statements)

References 17 publications

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“…In the United States, the much-discussed Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 ( GINA ) (2008) offers protection mainly in the domains of health insurance and employment [7]. In the United Kingdom, the Association of British Insurers and the British government have agreed on a Concordat and Moratorium on Genetics and Insurance that significantly restricts the capacity of British insurers to request genetic information from insurance applicants [8]. Australian (2008 amendment to the Disability Discrimination Act ), Canadian and East Asian policymakers have also been active in this area, although less so than their European counterparts [6,9].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Genetic discrimination and life insurance: a systematic review of the evidence

Joly

Feze

Simard

2013

BMC Med

110

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BackgroundSince the late 1980s, genetic discrimination has remained one of the major concerns associated with genetic research and clinical genetics. Europe has adopted a plethora of laws and policies, both at the regional and national levels, to prevent insurers from having access to genetic information for underwriting. Legislators from the United States and the United Kingdom have also felt compelled to adopt protective measures specifically addressing genetics and insurance. But does the available evidence really confirm the popular apprehension about genetic discrimination and the subsequent genetic exceptionalism?MethodsThis paper presents the results of a systematic, critical review of over 20 years of genetic discrimination studies in the context of life insurance.ResultsThe available data clearly document the existence of individual cases of genetic discrimination. The significance of this initial finding is, however, greatly diminished by four observations. First, the methodology used in most of the studies is not sufficiently robust to clearly establish either the prevalence or the impact of discriminatory practices. Second, the current body of evidence was mostly developed around a small number of 'classic' genetic conditions. Third, the heterogeneity and small scope of most of the studies prevents formal statistical analysis of the aggregate results. Fourth, the small number of reported genetic discrimination cases in some studies could indicate that these incidents took place due to occasional errors, rather than the voluntary or planned choice, of the insurers.ConclusionImportant methodological limitations and inconsistencies among the studies considered make it extremely difficult, at the moment, to justify policy action taken on the basis of evidence alone. Nonetheless, other empirical and theoretical factors have emerged (for example, the prevalence and impact of the fear of genetic discrimination among patients and research participants, the (un)importance of genetic information for the commercial viability of the private life insurance industry, and the need to develop more equitable schemes of access to life insurance) that should be considered along with the available evidence of genetic discrimination for a more holistic view of the debate.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Genetic discrimination and life insurance: a systematic review of the evidence

Joly

Feze

Simard

2013

BMC Med

110

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“…Similar fears were expressed in the 1990s and 2000s during the debate on the use of genetic information in insurance (Wauters and Van Hoyweghen, 2016). In the end, many of the scenarios turned out to be exaggerated, as a lack scientific progress, public opposition and new legislation hindered insurers' use of genomic data (Thomas, 2012;Wauters and Van Hoyweghen, 2016). Given the existing evidence, it is too early to evaluate whether insurers will take up behaviour-based personalisation and whether they can make it work (McFall and Moor, 2018: 205).…”

Section: Understanding Insurancementioning

confidence: 89%

Contested technology: Social scientific perspectives of behaviour-based insurance

Tanninen

2020

Big Data & Society

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In this review, I analyse how ‘behaviour-based personalisation’ in insurance – that is, insurers’ increased interest in tracking and manipulating insureds’ behaviour with, for instance, wearable devices – has been approached in recent social scientific literature. In the review, I focus on two streams of literature, critical data studies and the sociology of insurance, discussing the new (i.e. health and life) insurance schemes that utilise sensor-generated and digital data. The aim of this review is to compare these two approaches and to analyse what kinds of understandings, methodologies and theoretical perspectives they apply to so-called ‘behaviour-based insurance’. The critical data studies literature emphasises the exploitative aspects of these new technologies and mobilises behaviour-based insurance to exemplify the negative outcomes of digital health. Scholars from the field of the sociology of insurance empirically analyse the practices of behavioural-based personalisation and study how regulating and ‘doing’ insurance affect attempts to personalise it. I highlight the importance of approaching insurance as a specific financial technology and argue that more research is needed to understand the practices of developing behaviour-based insurance schemes and the insureds’ experiences.

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“…The right amount of restriction depends on the response of higher and lower risks to changes in the prices they face, that is the demand elasticities of higher and lower risks. Some restrictions on genetic tests may well be helpful in inducing the right amount of adverse selection (that is, the level 4 Thomas (2012) and Chapter 7 of give a fuller discussion of other rationales. that maximises loss coverage); on the other hand, restrictions on age as well might 'go too far', and so induce too much adverse selection and lower loss coverage.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Why Insurers Are Wrong about Adverse Selection

Thomas

2018

Laws

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Insurers typically argue that regulatory limits on their ability to use genetic tests will induce 'adverse selection'; they say that this has disadvantages not just for insurers, but also for society as a whole. I argue that, even on its own terms, this argument is often flawed. From the viewpoint of society as a whole, not all adverse selection is adverse. Limits on genetic discrimination that induce the right amount of adverse selection (but not too much adverse selection) can increase 'loss coverage', and so make insurance work better for society as a whole.

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Genetics and insurance in the United Kingdom 1995–2010: the rise and fall of “scientific” discrimination

Cited by 10 publications

References 17 publications

Genetic discrimination and life insurance: a systematic review of the evidence

Genetic discrimination and life insurance: a systematic review of the evidence

Contested technology: Social scientific perspectives of behaviour-based insurance

Why Insurers Are Wrong about Adverse Selection

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