Genetically modified seeds and plant propagating material in Europe: potential routes of entrance and current status

Abstract

Genetically modified organisms (GMO), mainly crop plants, are increasingly grown worldwide leading to large trade volumes of living seeds and other plant material both for cultivation and for food and animal feed. Even though all the traded GMOs have been assessed for their safety with regards to human and animal health and the environment, there still are some concerns regarding the potential uncontrolled release in the environment of authorized or unauthorized GM plants. In this review, we identify the possible entrance routes of GM seeds and other propagating plant material in the EU which could be linked to unauthorized release of GMOs in the environment. In addition, we discuss the situation with GM plant cultivation in some non-EU countries in terms of potential risks for GM seed imports. The available body of information suggests that GM seeds and plant propagating material can enter the EU due to problems with labeling/traceability of GM seed lots, contamination of conventional seed lots and accidental release into the environment of grains imported for food and animal feed. Even though cases of uncontrolled release of authorized GMOs, as well as, release of unauthorized GMOs have been reported, they can be generally attributed to adventitious and technically unavoidable presence with little environmental impact. In conclusion, the probability of GM seeds and plant propagating material illegally entering the cultivation in EU is unlikely. However, specific monitoring programs need to be established and maintained to facilitate the compliance of European farmers with the current GMO legislation.

The Rapeseed Potential in Poland and Germany in the Context of Production, Legislation, and Intellectual Property Rights

“…A significant share of the EU oilseed plants import belongs to GM soybean. According to the EU Commission, between 2014 and 2016, the EU imported more than 30 million tons of GM soybean annually, including Poland, which imported 2 million tons (Rostoks et al, 2019). Replacing imported GM soybean meal with domestically grown oilseed, such as rapeseed, in the feed industry is currently not an achievable and practical alternative because of technical and climatic limitations.…”

Potential risk evaluation for unintended entry of genetically modified plant Propagating material in Europe through import of seeds and animal feed – the experience of Latvia

“…2 It is known that with increased sample size and increased number of test replicates the number of positive samples increases, especially when low contamination levels are considered, but the cost limits of laboratory testing have to be taken into account. 31,32 The tested seeds intended for cultivation were certified in Austria, Czech Republic, France, Estonia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, Hungary, and Germany. Among the analyzed 110 seed samples, only two samples contained low-level admixtures of authorized GM seed material.…”

Facing the 2020 pandemic: What does cyberbiosecurity want us to know to safeguard the future?

“…The cyber-based interface to measure and assess a bioengineered product or service creates a gap, potentially allowing a range of vulnerabilities, from falsifiable entries of biological databases and sequence errors [ 12 , 38 ] - which in a context like pathogens could lead to entry errors with rather disturbing effects - the intentional tampering of data related to forensics [ 67 ], cyber- enabled attacks on systems monitoring water security [ 68 ], to the actual exchange of the purported actual (CPS produced) entity. The latter may enable the distribution of accidentally exchanged/counterfeit products such as plasmids [ 20 ] or illicit feed additives and contaminated feed consignments [ 40 , 69 , 70 ]. Such a gap may be exploited by attackers to hide manipulated (hazardous) biologicals behind the digital description of its natural or (when engineered), legitimate and approved counterparts.…”