Genetic Racial Profiling

Abstract

Over the last two decades, the analysis of DNA traces found at a crime scene have expanded the already established forensic DNA analysis for identification to include new techniques intended to predict a criminal suspect’s externally visible characteristics, such as eye, hair and skin colour (‘forensic DNA phenotyping’), or his or her ethnic, continental or regional origin (‘biogeographical ancestry’). In this paper, we conduct a dispositive analysis to investigate how extended DNA analysis in forensics catalyses inherent processes of racialization at three different levels: 1) in the categorizations that are integral to this technology, 2) in the images of the ‘dangerous other’ combined with inflated expectations regarding these technologies’ effectiveness that have framed discourses regarding the legalization of this technology, and 3) in the biases and stereotypes which often guide investigative practices using these technologies. We demonstrate that this is an example par excellence of how the interaction between different practice dimensions can exacerbate unintended discriminating, racialising and racist effects.

‘Crisis’, control and circulation: Biometric surveillance in the policing of the ‘crimmigrant other’

“…The technology, several scholars have argued, works by generating 'racialised collectives' (Wade, 2020) in a setting that utilises material traits through the meaning of cultural bias about specific populations among wider audiences of such information (e.g. publics asked for fDp-informed eyewitness information in an investigation) (Bartram et al, 2021(Bartram et al, , 2022Skinner, 2020).…”

Forensic DNA phenotyping: Privacy breach, bias reification and the pitfalls of abstract assessments of rights

“…Moreover, the absence of proof of necessity, if not a proof of absence, should at the very least be considered a legitimate obstacle to its legalization, pending the results of comprehensive and evidence-based research aiming at retrospective analysis of the concrete results it has brought in criminal investigation. However, because ‘no systematic data are available in its outcomes’ (Bartram et al 2022:55), conducting such research would require the creation of specific database where records of generated profiles and case linked would be registered, following a systematized format (Samuel and Prainsack, 2020) as well as the active collaboration of public authorities regarding access to this database. Thus, an impactful policy could consist in organizing such conditions for a retrospective analysis of the actual effect of FDP in criminal investigations.…”

“…Earlier in the article, the ‘morphologic’ characters were described as ‘eye colour, skin colour and hair colour’. In the same manner, an American private laboratory (Parabon NanoLabs Inc.) claims on its website to be able to provide perfectly accurate ‘composite portraits’ that have led to arrests, when these images are generated using merely racial-typological stereotypes (Bartram et al, 2022; Wienroth, 2020a). Financial gains and conflicts of interests behind the legalization of FDP are thus to be kept in mind when gathering information on the tangible outcomes of the technology.…”

“…Yet, as one author points out, the ‘lack of utility’ of FDP in solving a case did not prevent ‘a vocal prominent group of law enforcement officers, political opinion and decision-makers and scientists argued in favour of socio-technical innovation’ (Wienroth, 2020b:95). Moreover, because most information related to the effect of FDP in criminal proceedings is only available through press releases, it is subject to multiple interpretations that also complicate objective analysis of the results FDP achieves (Bartram et al 2022).…”

“…Moreover, prejudices linked to BGA results can also affect minorities by strengthening the tendency to ‘tunnel vision’ in police forces, or ‘concentrating on a single lead and disregarding relevant clues that oppose this lead’ (Koops and Schellekens, 2006: 194). This could lead to harassment of certain communities through biased identity checks or constant surveillance, or by putting members of the designated category under pressure to ‘take responsibility as a “community” only because of a common ethnic or religious background’ (Bartram et al 2022: 58).…”