Genetic information insecurity as state of the art

Schumacher, Garrett J.; Sawaya, Sterling; Nelson, Demetrius; Hansen, Aaron J.

doi:10.1101/2020.07.08.192666

Cited by 5 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 39 publications

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“…The benefits of advances in genetic engineering technology, however, do not allay concerns about the development of synthetic biology, as the products of genetic engineering have significantly altered the life characteristics of engineered living organisms. In particular, the bio-risk aspects and any unexpected effects have not been fully analyzed in the strains which have been engineered by reducing metabolic pathways or deletion of unnecessary genes because of the uncertain consequence of the deletion of "necessary gene, " which might turn out to be necessary in some unrecognized context (Schumacher et al, 2020).…”

Section: Metabolism Of Engineered Organismsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Advances in Synthetic Biology and Biosafety Governance

Zhao

Zheng

et al. 2021

Front. Bioeng. Biotechnol.

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Tremendous advances in the field of synthetic biology have been witnessed in multiple areas including life sciences, industrial development, and environmental bio-remediation. However, due to the limitations of human understanding in the code of life, any possible intended or unintended uses of synthetic biology, and other unknown reasons, the development and application of this technology has raised concerns over biosafety, biosecurity, and even cyberbiosecurity that they may expose public health and the environment to unknown hazards. Over the past decades, some countries in Europe, America, and Asia have enacted laws and regulations to control the application of synthetic biology techniques in basic and applied research and this has resulted in some benefits. The outbreak of the COVID-19 caused by novel coronavirus SARS-CoV-2 and various speculations about the origin of this virus have attracted more attention on bio-risk concerns of synthetic biology because of its potential power and uncertainty in the synthesis and engineering of living organisms. Therefore, it is crucial to scrutinize the control measures put in place to ensure appropriate use, promote the development of synthetic biology, and strengthen the governance of pathogen-related research, although the true origin of coronavirus remains hotly debated and unresolved. This article reviews the recent progress made in the field of synthetic biology and combs laws and regulations in governing bio-risk issues. We emphasize the urgent need for legislative and regulatory constraints and oversight to address the biological risks of synthetic biology.

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Section: Metabolism Of Engineered Organismsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Advances in Synthetic Biology and Biosafety Governance

Zhao

Zheng

et al. 2021

Front. Bioeng. Biotechnol.

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“…Lastly, thank you to the reviewers and editorial team for their time and valuable input. This manuscript was previously released as a pre-print at bioRxiv ( Schumacher et al, 2020 ).…”

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confidence: 99%

Genetic Information Insecurity as State of the Art

Schumacher

Sawaya²,

Nelson³

et al. 2020

Front. Bioeng. Biotechnol.

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Genetic information is being generated at an increasingly rapid pace, offering advances in science and medicine that are paralleled only by the threats and risk present within the responsible systems. Human genetic information is identifiable and contains sensitive information, but genetic information security is only recently gaining attention. Genetic data is generated in an evolving and distributed cyber-physical system, with multiple subsystems that handle information and multiple partners that rely and influence the whole ecosystem. This paper characterizes a general genetic information system from the point of biological material collection through long-term data sharing, storage and application in the security context. While all biotechnology stakeholders and ecosystems are valuable assets to the bioeconomy, genetic information systems are particularly vulnerable with great potential for harm and misuse. The security of post-analysis phases of data dissemination and storage have been focused on by others, but the security of wet and dry laboratories is also challenging due to distributed devices and systems that are not designed nor implemented with security in mind. Consequently, industry standards and best operational practices threaten the security of genetic information systems. Extensive development of laboratory security will be required to realize the potential of this emerging field while protecting the bioeconomy and all of its stakeholders.

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