Genetic Ignorance, Moral Obligations and Social Duties

Abstract

In a contribution to The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, Professor Rosamond Rhodes argues that individuals sometimes have an obligation to know about their genetic disorders, because this is required by their status as autonomous persons. Her analysis, which is based on Kant's concept of autonomy and Aristotle's notion of friendship, is extended here to consequentialist concerns. These are of paramount importance if, as we believe and Professor Rhodes herself implies, the Kantian and Aristotelian doctrines can be helpful only in the sphere of private morality, not in the public realm. Better tools for assessing the right to genetic ignorance as an issue of public policy can, we contend, be found in Mill's ideas concerning liberty and the prevention of harm. Our own conclusion, based on the Millian way of thinking, is that individuals probably do have the right to remain in ignorance in the cases Professor Rhodes presents as examples of a duty to know.

Is it Wrong to Deliberately Conceive or Give Birth to a Child with Mental Retardation?

“…8. About the right to know or not to know regarding one's genetic constitution see Takala, 1999 andTakala andHa Èyry, 2000. 9.…”

Parental duties and prenatal screening: Does an offer of prenatal screening lead women to believe that they are morally compelled to test?

“…It has been argued that women who decide not to undergo testing are morally responsible for intentionally bringing a disabled child into the world, for whom future suffering could have been avoided (Harris, 2000;Bennett and Harris, 2002;Suter, 2002). Consequently, women who are offered a prenatal test may believe that they have a moral duty to be tested in order to ensure the health of their future child (Buchanan et al, 2000;Clarkeburn, 2000;Mulvey and Wallace, 2000;Press, 2000;Takala and Häyry, 2000;Zoppi et al, 2001).…”

Diversity and uniformity in genetic responsibility: moral attitudes of patients, relatives and lay people in Germany and Israel

“…This is an important area of the new genetics which increases the range of choices open to the healthcare consumer (Slowther 2008; Vallance and Ford 2003). In general, responsibility involves moral and philosophical questions of causality, control and justification (Fischer and Ravizza 1998; Jonas 1979, 1985; Feinberg 1970; Lübbe 1994), which in the context of genetic testing raise questions of respecting self-determination, discreetness, determinism and prevention (Chadwick et al 1997; Rhodes 1998; Takala and Häyry 2000; Andre et al 2000). However, most of the work done in this field concentrates on expert responsibility which is discussed from a professional and universalistic point of view.…”