Genetic engineering and the dignity of creatures

Heeger, Robert

doi:10.1007/bf02694134

Cited by 7 publications

(3 citation statements)

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“…In six articles published in the ''Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics'' and in two articles published in the journal ''Environmental Values'' concerns about the value of biotic entities were discussed in detail. Among these articles, three dealt with the concepts ''integrity'' and ''dignity'' (Balzer et al 2000;Melin 2004;Lammerts van Bueren and Struik 2005), three with the concept of ''integrity'' (Verhoog et al 2003;Dobson 1995;Westra 1998), and one with the concept of ''dignity'' (Heeger 2000). Another article discussed the intrinsic value of animals and also mentioned that of plants (Verhoog 1992).…”

Section: Concerns About the Value Of Biotic Entitiesmentioning

confidence: 96%

Ethical Discourse on the Use of Genetically Modified Crops: A Review of Academic Publications in the Fields of Ecology and Environmental Ethics

Gregorowius

Lindemann‐Matthies

Huppenbauer

2011

J Agric Environ Ethics

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The use of genetically modified plants in agriculture (GM crops) is controversially discussed in academic publications. Important issues are whether the release of GM crops is beneficial or harmful for the environment and therefore acceptable, and whether the modification of plants is ethically permissible per se. This study provides a comprehensive overview of the moral reasoning on the use of GM crops expressed in academic publications from 1975 to 2008. Environmental ethical aspects in the publications were investigated. Overall, 113 articles from 15 ecology, environmental ethics, and multidisciplinary science journals were systematically reviewed. Three types of moral concerns were used to structure the normative statements, moral notions, and moral issues found in the articles: concerns addressing consequences of the use of GM crops, concerns addressing the act (the technique itself), and concerns addressing the virtues of an actor. Articles addressing consequences (84%) dealt with general ecological and risk concerns or discussed specific ecological issues about the use of GM crops. Articles addressing the act (57%) dealt with the value of naturalness, the value of biotic entities, and conceptual reductionism, whereas articles addressing the actor (43%) dealt with virtues related to the handling of risks and the application of GM crops. The results of this study may help to structure the academic debate and contribute to a better understanding of moral concerns that are associated with the key aspects of the ethical theories of consequentialism, deontology, and virtue ethics.

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Section: Concerns About the Value Of Biotic Entitiesmentioning

confidence: 96%

Ethical Discourse on the Use of Genetically Modified Crops: A Review of Academic Publications in the Fields of Ecology and Environmental Ethics

Gregorowius

Lindemann‐Matthies

Huppenbauer

2011

J Agric Environ Ethics

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“…In this respect, they are making a philosophical argument that parallels the animal rights approach in animal ethics, but the authors I have cited above all appear to recognize that it is not an individual creature that is harmed by blind chicken strategies or modifications of telos, and that to the contrary, the individual animals are better off than they otherwise might be. As such, the "dignity of the creature" noted by Balzer, Rippe and Schaber is dignity in an abstract sense (see also [10], or perhaps it is the integrity of the animal that is being affected adversely [26,38]. Rob De Vries [37] has undertaken a careful analysis of the way that the term 'animal integrity' has been applied to the evaluation of genetic engineering.…”

Section: Rollin's Critics: Against Genetically Engineered Animalsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Opposite of Human Enhancement: Nanotechnology and the Blind Chicken Problem

Thompson

2008

Nanoethics

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Nanotechnologies that have been linked to the possibility of enhancing cognitive capabilities of human beings might also be deployed to reduce or eliminate such capabilities in non-human vertebrate animals. A surprisingly large literature on the ethics of such disenhancement has been developed in response to the suggestion that it would be an ethically defensible response to animal suffering both in medical experimentation and in industrial livestock production. However, review of this literature illustrates the difficulty of formulating a coherent ethical debate. Well structured arguments for disenhancement can be made on the basis of mainstream views on the basis of ethical obligations to animals, but these arguments have not been persuasive against the moral intuition that disenhancements are unethical. At the same time, attempts to ground these intuitions in a coherent philosophical doctrine have been plagued by logical fallacies and question begging assertions. As such, the debate over animal disenhancement forecasts an enduring conundrum with respect to the core question of transforming the nature of sentient beings, and this conundrum is logically independent of claims that relate either to the distinctive of human beings or to issues deriving from the emphasis on enhancement.

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“…This article is an English translation of the expert report. The viewpoint of Balzer et al is problemized in some other articles in the same issue of Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics -Heeger, Robert: ''Genetic Engineering and the Dignity of Creatures,'' Brom, Frans W. A.: ''The Good Life of Creatures with Dignity -Some Comments on the Swiss Expert Opinion,'' and Jaber, Dunja: ''Human Dignity and the Dignity of Creatures'' -but I will not enter this debate here (Brom, 2000;Heeger, 2000;Jaber, 2000). 34 Balzer et al (2000, p. 19).…”

Section: A Comparison With Individualistic Ethical Theoriesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Genetic engineering and the Moral Status of Non-Human Species

Melin

2004

J Agric Environ Ethics

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Genetic modification leads to several important moral issues. Up until now they have been discussed from the viewpoint that only individual living beings, above all animals, are morally considerable. The standpoint that also collective entities such as species belong to the moral sphere have seldom been taken into account in a more thorough way, although it is advocated by several important environmental ethicists. The main purpose of this article is to analyze in more detail than often has been done what the practical consequences of this ethical position would be for the use of genetic engineering on animals and plants. The practical consequences of the holistic standpoint (focused on collective entities) of Holmes Rolson, III, is compared with the practical consequences of the individualistic standpoints (focused on individual living beings) of Bernard E. Rollin and Philipp Balzer, Klaus Peter Rippe, and Peter Schaber, respectively. The article also discusses whether the claim that species are morally considerable is tenable as a foundation for policy decisions on genetic engineering.

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Genetic engineering and the dignity of creatures

Cited by 7 publications

References 1 publication

Ethical Discourse on the Use of Genetically Modified Crops: A Review of Academic Publications in the Fields of Ecology and Environmental Ethics

Ethical Discourse on the Use of Genetically Modified Crops: A Review of Academic Publications in the Fields of Ecology and Environmental Ethics

The Opposite of Human Enhancement: Nanotechnology and the Blind Chicken Problem

Genetic engineering and the Moral Status of Non-Human Species

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