Generic open theism and some varieties thereof

Abstract

The goal of this paper is to facilitate ongoing dialogue between open and non-open theists. First, I try to make precise what open theism is by distinguishing the core commitments of the position from other secondary and optional commitments. The result is a characterization of ‘generic open theism’, the minimal set of commitments that any open theist, qua open theist, must affirm. Second, within the framework of generic open theism, I distinguish three important variants and discuss challenges distinctive to each. The significance of this approach is that it helps avoid conflating arguments bearing on specific versions of open theism with arguments pertaining to open theism simpliciter.

An Examination of the Biblical Evidence for Open Theism

“…Alan R. Rhoda's work is especially instructive on this point. 3 He lists four primary features of Open Theism:…”

“…Since (1) is one of Open Theism's primary commitments, this makes it a type of theism. According to (3), the future is epistemically open for God only because and only to the extent that it is causally open. 5 (2) posits libertarian free will and (4) posits an incompatibility between divine foreknowledge and libertarian free will.…”

“…5 (2) posits libertarian free will and (4) posits an incompatibility between divine foreknowledge and libertarian free will. Of these four features, (3) is what distinguishes Open Theism from its rivals.…”

A Randomness‐based Theodicy for Evolutionary Evils

“…Here, we note just that it is perhaps easiest to see how this theory of God's experiences could fit with simple foreknowledge and open theist views. For on either of these views, God's knowledge of how the world unfolds depends in part upon the choices of creatures and the events of creation, and not entirely upon God's decisions (see Rhoda , 225–34; Zimmerman , 174–202). Thus, God may partake in the good of enjoying curiosity, anticipation, surprise, and appreciation as God discovers how creation precisely unfolds.…”

The Philosophical Case for Open Theism

“…Indeed, a central dialectic among theists consists in whether to accept both (2) and (3), and consequently (4), or whether to reject (4) and with it either (2) or (3). In these terms, open theism falls squarely between two competing theistic traditions: the 'theological determinism' of 4 Rhoda (2008). 5 The future is 'causally open' with respect to state of affairs X, present time t, and future time t* if and only if, given all that exists as of t, it is really possible both that X obtains at t* and that X does not obtain at t*.…”