Generic constructions of secure‐channel free searchable encryption with adaptive security

Abstract

For searching keywords against encrypted data, the public key encryption scheme with keyword search (PEKS), and its an extension called secure-channel free PEKS (SCF-PEKS) have been proposed. In SCF-PEKS, a receiver makes a trapdoor for a keyword, and uploads it on a server. A sender computes an encrypted keyword, and sends it to the server. The server executes the searching procedure (called the test algorithm, which takes as inputs an encrypted keyword, trapdoor, and secret key of the server). In this paper, we extend the security of SCF-PEKS, calling it adaptive SCF-PEKS, wherein an adversary (modeled as a "malicious-but-legitimate" receiver) is allowed to issue test queries adaptively, and show that adaptive SCF-PEKS can be generically constructed by anonymous identity-based encryption (anonymous IBE) only. That is, for constructing adaptive SCF-PEKS we need not require any additional cryptographic primitive when compared to the Abdalla et al. PEKS construction (J. Cryptology 2008), even though adaptive SCF-PEKS requires additional functionalities. Note that our generic construction needs to apply the KEM/DEM framework (a.k.a. hybrid encryption), where KEM stands for key encapsulation mechanism, and DEM stands for data encapsulation mechanism. We also show that there is a class of anonymous IBE that can be applied for constructing adaptive SCF-PEKS without using hybrid encryption, and propose an adaptive SCF-PEKS construction based on this IBE. Although our second construction is not fully generic, it is efficient compared to the first, since we can exclude the DEM part. Finally, we instantiate an adaptive SCF-PEKS scheme (via our second construction) that achieves a similar level of efficiency for the costs of the test procedure and encryption, compared to the (non-adaptive secure) SCF-PEKS scheme by Fang et al. (CANS2009).

Constructing designated server public key encryption with keyword search schemes withstanding keyword guessing attacks

“…Comparison and analysis show that our semi‐generic edPEKS construction introduces very few additional costs to enhance the underlying dPEKS scheme to obtain the security against all the exiting known types of KG attacks. We note that if applying our method to the previous generic dPEKS constructions, then we will get several new semi‐generic edPEKS constructions that are based on some more normal cryptographic primitives, such as (anonymous) IBE.…”

“…Following the proposal of Baek et al, lots of dPEKS schemes were presented . In addition, the generic dPEKS constructing methods were also proposed . Rhee et al showed that a dPEKS scheme can be generically derived by combining two IBE schemes in parallel or in sequence.…”

“…Rhee et al showed that a dPEKS scheme can be generically derived by combining two IBE schemes in parallel or in sequence. Later, Emura et al proposed a generic dPEKS construction from anonymous IBE, tag‐based encryption, and one‐time signature. Some works extended dPEKS into IBE/CLE and proposed several designated server IBE/CLE with keyword search schemes.…”

Enhancing Security Solutions with Collaborative Cryptography and Digital Signature Scheme in Cloud services

“…They also presented an SCF-PEKS scheme secure under the enhanced security model in the random oracle model. Another extension on SCF-PEKS is by Emura et al [5]. They enhanced the security model by introducing the adaptively secure SCF-PEKS, wherein an adversary is allowed to issue test queries adaptively.…”

“…Fang et al [6] proposed a concrete SCF-PEKS scheme with KGA resilience. Similar to the work in [5], they also considered the adaptive test oracle in their proposed security definition.…”