Generation of Shared RSA Keys by Two Parties

Poupard, Guillaume; Stern, Jacques

doi:10.1007/3-540-49649-1_2

Cited by 30 publications

(20 citation statements)

References 22 publications

(40 reference statements)

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“…Concurrently, Poupard and Stern [PS98] proposed a solution that runs in time proportional to the size of the domain from which the primes are sampled, which is exponential in the security parameter. Poupard and Stern made attempts to reduce the running time by introducing various modifications.…”

Section: Distributed Generation Of An Rsa Compositementioning

confidence: 99%

Efficient RSA Key Generation and Threshold Paillier in the Two-Party Setting

Hazay

Mikkelsen

Rabin³

et al. 2012

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

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The problem of generating an RSA composite in a distributed manner without leaking its factorization is particularly challenging and useful in many cryptographic protocols. Our first contribution is the first non-generic fully simulatable protocol for distributively generating an RSA composite with security against malicious behavior. Our second contribution is a complete Paillier [Pai99] threshold encryption scheme in the two-party setting with security against malicious attacks. We further describe how to extend our protocols to the multiparty setting with dishonest majority.Our RSA key generation protocol is comprised of the following sub-protocols: (i) a distributed protocol for generation of an RSA composite, and (ii) a biprimality test for verifying the validity of the generated composite. Our Paillier threshold encryption scheme uses the RSA composite for the publickey and is comprised of the following sub-protocols: (i) a distributed generation of the corresponding secret-key shares and, (ii) a distributed decryption protocol for decrypting according to Paillier.

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Section: Distributed Generation Of An Rsa Compositementioning

confidence: 99%

Efficient RSA Key Generation and Threshold Paillier in the Two-Party Setting

Hazay

Mikkelsen

Rabin³

et al. 2012

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

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“…This computation, secure against malicious adversaries, can be done using the results of Blackburn et al [7] or of Poupard and Stern [58].…”

Section: Common Reference String (Crs)mentioning

confidence: 99%

Secure computation of functionalities based on Hamming distance and its application to computing document similarity

Jarrous

Pinkas

2013

IJACT

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This paper examines secure two-party computation of functions which depend only on the Hamming distance of the inputs of the two parties. We present efficient protocols for computing these functions. In particular, we present protocols which are secure in the sense of full simulatability against malicious adversaries.We then show applications of HDOT. These include protocols for checking similarity between documents without disclosing additional information about them (these protocols are based on algorithms of Broder et. al. for computing document similarity based on the Jaccard measure). Another application is a variant of symmetric private information retrieval (SPIR), which can be used if the server's database contains N entries, at most N/ log N of which have individual values, and the rest are set to some default value. The receiver does not learn whether it receives an individual value or the default value. This variant of PIR is unique since it can be based on the existence of OT alone.

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“…In fact, it is often the case that threshold cryptosystems (assuming a strict minority of corrupted players) are developed before the corresponding two-party cryptosystems. For example, threshold DSA [12,34,29] was developed before two-party DSA [36], and threshold RSA key generation [4,25] was developed before two-party RSA key generation [28,41].…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

An Efficient Two-Party Public Key Cryptosystem Secure against Adaptive Chosen Ciphertext Attack

MacKenzie

2002

Public Key Cryptography — PKC 2003

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Abstract.We propose an efficient two-party public key cryptosystem that is secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext attack, based on the hardness of Decision Diffie-Hellman (DDH). Specifically, we show that the two parties together can decrypt ciphertexts, but neither can alone. Our system is based on the Cramer-Shoup cryptosystem. Previous results on efficient threshold cryptosystems secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext attack required either (1) a strict majority of uncorrupted decryption servers, and thus do not apply to the two-party scenario, or (2) the random oracle assumption, and thus were not proven secure in the "standard" model.

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Generation of Shared RSA Keys by Two Parties

Cited by 30 publications

References 22 publications

Efficient RSA Key Generation and Threshold Paillier in the Two-Party Setting

Efficient RSA Key Generation and Threshold Paillier in the Two-Party Setting

Secure computation of functionalities based on Hamming distance and its application to computing document similarity

An Efficient Two-Party Public Key Cryptosystem Secure against Adaptive Chosen Ciphertext Attack

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