DOI: 10.5204/thesis.eprints.121760
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Generating Attacks and Labelling Attack Datasets for Industrial Control Intrusion Detection Systems

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Cited by 5 publications
(4 citation statements)
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“…An attacker can obtain the network control through a phishing attack to the site operators [9] or by exploiting the security lack of the legacy devices connected to the Internet [11]. There are different actions that malicious actors can perform, but it is possible to categorize the main ones into five different classes [55], [56] of network attack. These attacks are also implemented in the testbeds to generate abnormal operating conditions.…”
Section: A Typical Attacksmentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…An attacker can obtain the network control through a phishing attack to the site operators [9] or by exploiting the security lack of the legacy devices connected to the Internet [11]. There are different actions that malicious actors can perform, but it is possible to categorize the main ones into five different classes [55], [56] of network attack. These attacks are also implemented in the testbeds to generate abnormal operating conditions.…”
Section: A Typical Attacksmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…QUT DNP3 [56], [187] is a dataset presented in the Ph.D. dissertation of the author. The dataset contains data collected from a small section of a transmission substation SCADA network.…”
Section: E Network Levelmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In addition, many commands of the protocol, such as reset command, query commands, and read commands, do not have authentication mechanisms built in, allowing unauthorized access. One exploit of the aforementioned protocol vulnerability would be the MITM-based FDI, which refers to an attacker who could intercept the logical connection between communicating devices (e.g., between MTU and RTU) [12] and inject their messages (e.g., a false command) through an MITM attack [13]. Given the lack of security mechanisms in the IEC-104 protocol, the attacker would then be able to read, modify, inject, or discard sent or new messages between the intercepted endpoints [14].…”
Section: A Cyber Security In Power Process Networkmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Moreover, further work is being done to present an approach to providing a data generation framework focused on DNP3 MITM-based injection attacks [21] and data and control manipulation attacks over IEC 61850 in secondary substations [22]. In addition, studies have been conducted on synthesis frameworks for specific attack vectors [23] as well as on an automated marking process for deployed protocol-specific attack [13]. In this context, research on stealthy MITM attacks for FDI in DNP3 or Profinet is also conducted in a cyber-physical test environment to analyze the impact on latency [24] or generate datasets for datadriven detection approaches [25].…”
Section: Related Workmentioning
confidence: 99%