The concept of distance rationalizability allows one to define new voting rules or "rationalize" existing ones via a consensus class of elections and a distance. A candidate is declared an election winner if she is the consensus candidate in one of the nearest consensus elections. It is known that many classic voting rules are defined or can be represented in this way. In this paper, we focus on the power and the limitations of the distance rationalizability approach. We first show that if we do not place any restrictions on the class of consensus profiles or possible distances then essentially all voting rules become distance-rationalizable. Thus, to make the concept of distance ratioanalizability meaningful, we have to restrict the class of distances involved. To this end, we present a very natural class of distances, which we call votewise distances. We investigate which voting rules can be rationalized via votewise distances and study the properties of such rules and study their relations with rules that are maximumlikelyhood estimators.