Generalized Dispositional Distrust as the Common Core of Populism and Conspiracy Mentality

Abstract

Populism and beliefs in conspiracy theories fuel societal division as both rely on a Manichean us-versusthem, good-versus-evil narrative. However, whether both constructs have the same dispositional roots is essentially unknown. Across three studies conducted in two different countries and using diverse samples (total N = 1,888), we show that populism and conspiracy mentality have a strong common core as evidenced using bifactor modeling. This common core was uniquely linked to (aversive) personality, namely the Dark Factor of Personality (D), beyond basic personality traits from the HEXACO Model of Personality Structure. The association between D and the common core, in turn, was fully accounted for by distrust-related beliefs as captured in cynicism, dangerous and competitive social worldviews, sensitivity to befallen injustice, and (low) trust propensity. Taken together, the results show that populism and conspiracy mentality have a shared psychological basis that is well described as a sociopolitically flavored manifestation of generalized dispositional distrust. The findings thus underscore the value of generalized trust for societal functioning and suggest that increasing trust may simultaneously combat both populism and beliefs in conspiracy theories.

How and why aversive personality is expressed in political preferences.

“…More generally, these results further underscore the importance of studying aversive personality in its own right (Rogoza et al, 2022; Schreiber & Marcus, 2020). Indeed, the findings are not only compatible with recent demonstrations that D substantially improves the prediction of other sociopolitical variables—specifically, populism and conspiracy mentality—beyond the basic personality space (Thielmann & Hilbig, 2023) but also adds to the growing body of findings demonstrating that D is functionally distinct from any one dimension in basic personality models (Hilbig et al, 2021; Horsten et al, 2021, 2021, 2023; Moshagen, Zettler, Horsten, et al, 2020).…”

“…Since individuals “do not usually engage in harmful conduct until they have justified to themselves the morality of their actions” (Bandura, 2016, p. 49), D is accompanied by a whole host of beliefs from which individuals may construct justifications for aversive behavior, including beliefs about the superiority of oneself or one’s group, generalized distrust, the need to defend oneself or one’s group against exploitation by others, the necessity of inequality, hierarchies, and dominance, the relative nature of moral judgment, and many others (Hilbig et al, 2022; Moshagen et al, 2018; Rudloff et al, 2022). Such beliefs play a prime role in the process of how D is expressed in aversive behavior (Hilbig et al, 2022) and also set D conceptually and empirically apart (Horsten et al, 2021; Moshagen, Zettler, & Horsten, 2020; Thielmann & Hilbig, 2023) from basic, broad personality dimensions such as Agreeableness from the five-factor model (e.g., McCrae & Costa, 2008) and Honesty-Humility from the HEXACO model of personality (Ashton & Lee, 2007).…”

“…More precisely, a major class of beliefs held by individuals high in D involves distrust in the most general sense, including considering others untrustworthy, cynicism (i.e., believing that most people are exploitative and unethical), sensitivity to befallen injustice (i.e., constantly sensing unfair treatment by others), and viewing the world as a competitive jungle and a dangerous and threatening place (Hilbig et al, 2022; Thielmann & Hilbig, 2023). These beliefs are mostly descriptive in nature (describing what is , rather than what ought to be; Cialdini et al, 1990) and allege that one is under constant threat of exploitation by others, thus invoking that aversive behavior can be justified because “one needs to protect oneself,” “everyone does it,” or “eat or be eaten.” Indeed, from an economically “rational” point of view, it is strictly necessary to avoid cooperative or prosocial behavior in interdependent situations if one expects others to be exploitative (Thielmann et al, 2021).…”

“Trust me, do not trust anyone”: how epistemic mistrust and credulity are associated with conspiracy mentality

“…The notion that the associations between epistemic mistrust, credulity, and conspiracy mentality may have harmful social consequences is also suggested by recent structural equation models showing that generalized dispositional mistrust is the psychological common core of a conspiracy mentality and populist attitudes, represented by the strict division between the “normal people” versus the “corrupt elites” as well as between “the ingroup” versus “the outgroups” (Thielmann & Hilbig, 2023 ). In line with these insights, longitudinal, biannual studies using representative survey data from Germany show that manifested mistrust in communications by established authorities combined with a pronounced conspiracy mentality can contribute to an anti-democratic radicalization, characterized by far-right attitudes like antisemitism or islamophobia (Decker et al ., 2022 ).…”

On the Usefulness of the Conspiracy Mentality Concept

“…Associates are less trivially related and provide the opportunity for open empirical questions about the relation to conspiracy mentality. Such more distal associates have been established by showing reliable correlations of conspiracy mentality with low general trust (Thielmann & Hilbig, 2023), also behaviorally (Meuer & Imhoff, 2021), a higher perceptual threshold to detect trustworthiness (Frenken & Imhoff, 2023), a bias to suspect negative intention and secret coordination, even behind mundane everyday events (Frenken & Imhoff, 2022), low epistemic trust in high-power sources (Imhoff et al, 2018), or feelings of isolation when refraining from internet use (Jetten et al, 2023). The finding that conspiracy mentality is more pronounced in cultural contexts that are plagued by corruption (Alper & Imhoff, 2023) may be an indicator that part of this construct taps into the sensitivity for valid cues to untransparent and illegitimate actions.…”