2017
DOI: 10.1016/j.orl.2016.12.003
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Generalized assignment problem: Truthful mechanism design without money

Abstract: In this paper, we study a mechanism design problem for a strategic variant of the generalized assignment problem (GAP) in a both payment-free and priorfree environment. In GAP, a set of items has to be optimally assigned to a set of bins without exceeding the capacity of any singular bin. In the strategic variant of the problem we study, bins are held by strategic agents, and each agent may hide its compatibility with some items in order to obtain items of higher values. The compatibility between an agent and … Show more

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Cited by 8 publications
(4 citation statements)
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References 17 publications
(30 reference statements)
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“…In Table 5 selected test problems and determined parameters are given. In the selected problems, U [15,25], number of agent is 10 and number of jobs is 200. The largest problem size was preferred.…”
Section: Computational Resultsmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…In Table 5 selected test problems and determined parameters are given. In the selected problems, U [15,25], number of agent is 10 and number of jobs is 200. The largest problem size was preferred.…”
Section: Computational Resultsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Chakravarthy et al [24], proposed a heuristic algorithm for bottleneck generalized assignment problem. For a strategic variant of GAP, approximation algorithm is proposed by Fadaei and Bichler [25]. Detailed information for GAP can be found in the literature review by Öncan [11].…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Our work brings the idea of hiding manipulation from this literature to facility location, where it can be combined with complex preference structures and compared to the misreporting manipulation. We note that hiding parts of preferences is also well-studied in unweighted division and assignment problems (Fadaei and Bichler 2017).…”
Section: Related Workmentioning
confidence: 98%
“…Problem iki amaçlıdır. Amaçlardan ilki (6) ajan yüklerinin kareleri toplamının enküçüklenmesi iken, diğer amaç (7) işlerin atandığı toplam ajan sayısını enküçüklemektir. Kısıt (1) ajanların kapasite kısıtıdır, kısıt (2) her işin bir ajana atanmasını garantilemektedir.…”
Section: Problem Tanimi Ve Matemati̇ksel Model (Problem Definition An...unclassified