2020
DOI: 10.33735/phimisci.2020.ii.61
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Generality and content-specificity in the study of the neural correlates of perceptual consciousness

Abstract: The present paper was written as a contribution to ongoing methodological debates within the NCC project. We focus on the neural correlates of conscious perceptual episodes. Our claim is that the NCC notion, as applied to conscious perceptual episodes, needs to be reconceptualized. It mixes together the processing related to the perceived contents and the neural substrate of consciousness proper, i.e. mechanisms making the perceptual contents conscious. We thus propose that the perceptual NCC be divided into t… Show more

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Cited by 7 publications
(5 citation statements)
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“…As we ultimately strive to connect the phenomenal with the neural, we may also express this by using the terminology of neural correlates of consciousness (NCC). What has just been said is then in very good agreement with the claims of Marvan and Polák (2020) “that the perceptual NCC be divided into two constitutive subnotions. The first subnotion covers the content-specific side of the perceptual NCC… [T]he second subnotion [is] that of the neural process or processes making the perceptual contents… conscious.” The authors call the first subnotion the neural correlate of content (NCc) and the second the general neural correlate of consciousness (gNCC).…”
Section: Neurophenomenal Structuralismsupporting
confidence: 80%
“…As we ultimately strive to connect the phenomenal with the neural, we may also express this by using the terminology of neural correlates of consciousness (NCC). What has just been said is then in very good agreement with the claims of Marvan and Polák (2020) “that the perceptual NCC be divided into two constitutive subnotions. The first subnotion covers the content-specific side of the perceptual NCC… [T]he second subnotion [is] that of the neural process or processes making the perceptual contents… conscious.” The authors call the first subnotion the neural correlate of content (NCc) and the second the general neural correlate of consciousness (gNCC).…”
Section: Neurophenomenal Structuralismsupporting
confidence: 80%
“… 5 In Marvan and Polák (2020) essentially the same notion is labeled “general neural correlate of (perceptual) consciousness”. Here we speak directly of the causally involved neurobiological mechanism itself (the neurobiological CSAM) and focus only on the cellular level of brain description.…”
Section: Footnotesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Finally, GNW is criticized for mainly addressing the functional aspects of the perceptual, with little to no attention to its phenomenological aspects ( Seth & Bayne, 2022 ). Indeed, GNW research focuses mainly on identifying the process, rather than content-based neural correlates of consciousness ( Marvan & Polák, 2020 ). In other words, GNW left out the central question of “how it is like to have a given perceptual experience?”.…”
Section: Neural Correlates Of Perceptual Consciousness: Information A...mentioning
confidence: 99%