General Introduction

Sluiter, Ineke; Rosen, Ralph M.

doi:10.1163/ej.9789004189218.i-476.6

Cited by 3 publications

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“…Literally, parrhesia means “to say everything,” and it originally indicates “the freedom of the private [Athenian] citizen to say what he believes, in the way he wishes, and against whom he wants” (Scarpat, 1964, p. 29). The notion of truth, however, is clearly part of parrhesia 's semantic horizon, in the same way it is for avowal: Ineke Sluiter and Ralph Rosen argue that parrhesia “always involves frankness and the full disclosure of one's thoughts,” and that consequently the parrhesiast “must necessarily believe in the truth of what he is saying, or at least in the fact that to the best of his knowledge what he is saying is true” (2004, pp. 6–7).…”

Section: Questioning Power About Its Discourses Of Truthmentioning

confidence: 99%

The architectonic of Foucault's critique

Lorenzini

Tiisala

2023

European J of Philosophy

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This paper presents a new interpretation of Michel Foucault's critical project. It is well known that Foucault's genealogical critique does not focus on issues of justification, but instead tackles “aspectival captivity,” that is, apparently inevitable limits of thought that constrain the subject's freedom but that, in fact, can be transformed. However, it has not been recognized that, according to Foucault, critique can proceed along two distinct paths. In a key passage of “What Is Critique?,” Foucault states that critique is tasked with questioning truth about its effects of power and with questioning power about its discourses of truth. We show that this “double movement” organizes Foucault's critical project as a whole, giving it a significantly wider scope and a more complex structure than has been previously acknowledged. At the heart of the above‐mentioned bifurcation lies an apparent tension between two contrastive roles Foucault assigns to truth‐telling in the context of critique: on the one hand, truth‐telling (as avowal) is a target of critique; on the other, truth‐telling (as parrhesia) is one of critique's methods. We argue that combining these two dimensions in a unified account is crucial for understanding and re‐evaluating Foucault's critical project as a whole. By showing that truth‐telling remains an essential element of Foucauldian critique, this paper also rectifies some influential misinterpretations according to which Foucault's critical project seeks to eliminate truth from the picture.

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Section: Questioning Power About Its Discourses Of Truthmentioning

confidence: 99%

The architectonic of Foucault's critique

Lorenzini

Tiisala

2023

European J of Philosophy

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“…First Dionysios, the witness in trial A whose conviction for false testimony in 37 See Hillgruber (1988) 12, asking how Theomnestos could have persuaded the public arbitrator '[m]it solch einem kindischen Argument'; Todd (2007) 635, suggesting that 'some lingering sense of aporrhēta as words of ill-omen' may have been behind Theomnestos' strategy. 38 For discussion of what parrhēsia meant in practice and its place in democratic ideology, see, for example, Carter (2004), other essays in Sluiter and Rosen (2004) and Saxonhouse (2006).…”

Section: The Strategies Of the Litigantsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Regulating free speech in a democracy: Lysias 10Against Theomnestosand the law on slander

Livingstone

2023

J. Hell. Stud.

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Lysias 10 Against Theomnestos is the only surviving example of a classical Greek speech on a charge of slander (dikē kakēgorias). The case turns on establishing communal consensus in evaluation of meta-discursive claims: assertions as to what the law says about what citizens can say about their fellow citizens. I adapt Marmor’s account of the pragmatics of legal discourse to illuminate the litigants’ strategies as they seek to control interpretation of the legal question in this much-discussed case from 380s BC Athens. We see how each party used different assumptions about the law’s implicatures as well as its declarative meaning and presented these assumptions as grounded in common sense. The persuasive methods used by Lysias’ client are illuminated by means of cognitive narratology’s application of Lewisian possible-world logic to the creation of story-worlds and the relationships they generate between narrator and reader/audience. So understood, Lysias’ speech helps answer questions about the role and limits of free/frank speech (parrhēsia) in democratic Athens and about the relationship between individual agency and the collective agency of the dēmos, questions crucial to an understanding of the place of legal discourse and legal conflict in the ideology and day-to-day praxis of the democratic city.

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“…See Konstan 2009: 473-474;Brown 2012: 549. 92 Konstan 2009: 475-476;Brown 2012. The term oikeiosis was used by the Stoics to conceptualise a process of social appropriation, drawing increasingly large circles of fellow humans into one's sphere of belonging, which eventually led to a sense of community with all fellow humans: see Algra 2003, Joosse 2010, Sluiter and Rosen 2010. This type of thinking remains relevant into the modern age: see Nussbaum 1997 on the influence of Stoic cosmopolitanism on the political thinking of Immanuel Kant.…”

Section: A Cosmopolitan Imagined Communitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Carving communities in stone

Kamphorst¹

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General Introduction

Cited by 3 publications

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The architectonic of Foucault's critique

The architectonic of Foucault's critique

Regulating free speech in a democracy: Lysias 10Against Theomnestosand the law on slander

Carving communities in stone

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