2013 5th International Conference on Intelligent Networking and Collaborative Systems 2013
DOI: 10.1109/incos.2013.74
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General Certificateless Strong Designated Verifier Signature Schemes

Abstract: A certificateless strong designated verifier signature (CL-SDVS) may provide more convenient deployment than other SDVS schemes since user's public keys can be published freely and no key-escrow problem needed to be worried about. However, there are only several CL-SDVS schemes and their security is doubtable. This paper provides general CL-SDVS schemes and instances, and discusses their security briefly.

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Cited by 1 publication
(3 citation statements)
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“…Assume there is a malicious adversary who has leaned the information of original fog node's private key. Given a fresh signature which has not been received by the verifying group, the adversary might try to distinguish the fog node's identity by checking whether equation (5) or equation (19) holds or not. However, in equation (5) or equation (19), there is a meta value N which could be rewritten as It should be noted that without knowing the random integer z chosen by the fog node, no one could derive the parameter N to perform equation (5) or equation (19) successfully.…”
Section: Theoremmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 2 more Smart Citations
“…Assume there is a malicious adversary who has leaned the information of original fog node's private key. Given a fresh signature which has not been received by the verifying group, the adversary might try to distinguish the fog node's identity by checking whether equation (5) or equation (19) holds or not. However, in equation (5) or equation (19), there is a meta value N which could be rewritten as It should be noted that without knowing the random integer z chosen by the fog node, no one could derive the parameter N to perform equation (5) or equation (19) successfully.…”
Section: Theoremmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Given a fresh signature which has not been received by the verifying group, the adversary might try to distinguish the fog node's identity by checking whether equation (5) or equation (19) holds or not. However, in equation (5) or equation (19), there is a meta value N which could be rewritten as It should be noted that without knowing the random integer z chosen by the fog node, no one could derive the parameter N to perform equation (5) or equation (19) successfully. In a more formal approach of proofs, we display that if there is an SSA-distinguisher D 1 against the proposed time-constrained SMDVS variant, we could construct a DDH-distinguisher D 2 to solve a random DDH instance of (P, aP, bP, C).…”
Section: Theoremmentioning
confidence: 99%
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