2021
DOI: 10.1093/pq/pqab029
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Gene Editing, Identity and Benefit

Abstract: Some suggest that gene editing human embryos to prevent genetic disorders will be in one respect morally preferable to using genetic selection for the same purpose: gene editing will benefit particular future persons, while genetic selection would merely replace them. We first construct the most plausible defence of this suggestion—the benefit argument—and defend it against a possible objection. We then advance another objection: the benefit argument succeeds only when restricted to cases in which the gene-edi… Show more

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Cited by 15 publications
(2 citation statements)
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References 33 publications
(46 reference statements)
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“…Fortunately, many philosophers are already debating holobiont individuality in light of its potential theoretical, practical, and ethical consequences (e.g., Chiu and Eberl 2016 ; Skillings 2016 ; Kirby 2017 ; Şencan 2019 ; Suárez and Stencel 2020 ; Formosinho et al 2022 ). Similarly, McConwell’s proposal to study individuality in synthetic biology and biotechnology could be connected to the vast body of existing work in bioethics about identity in relation to cloning, genetic modification, and gene editing (e.g., Hauskeller 2004 ; Ankeny and Bray 2018 ; Douglas and Devolder 2022 ). Another politically and ethically relevant topic that McConwell fails to mention is the individuality of pregnant organisms and foetuses; again, this is a topic that has received recent attention, for instance in relation to immunological and metabolic criteria of individuality (Kingma 2020 ; Meincke 2021 ; Morgan 2022 ).…”
Section: Practicesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Fortunately, many philosophers are already debating holobiont individuality in light of its potential theoretical, practical, and ethical consequences (e.g., Chiu and Eberl 2016 ; Skillings 2016 ; Kirby 2017 ; Şencan 2019 ; Suárez and Stencel 2020 ; Formosinho et al 2022 ). Similarly, McConwell’s proposal to study individuality in synthetic biology and biotechnology could be connected to the vast body of existing work in bioethics about identity in relation to cloning, genetic modification, and gene editing (e.g., Hauskeller 2004 ; Ankeny and Bray 2018 ; Douglas and Devolder 2022 ). Another politically and ethically relevant topic that McConwell fails to mention is the individuality of pregnant organisms and foetuses; again, this is a topic that has received recent attention, for instance in relation to immunological and metabolic criteria of individuality (Kingma 2020 ; Meincke 2021 ; Morgan 2022 ).…”
Section: Practicesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…What is striking now that genetic modification, in the form of genome editing, is actually possible is the fragility of the grounds for this belief. While some contemporary writers have continued to maintain that genome editing would be person affecting (Cavaliere 2018;Gyngell, Douglas, and Savulescu 2017;Gyngell and Savulescu 2016;Powell, Kahane, and Savulescu 2012), Tom Douglas and Katrien Devolder have recently called this claim into question (Douglas and Devolder 2019). In order to understand why, we need both a better understanding of the science of genome editing and a willingness to confront some difficult philosophical-and perhaps even metaphysical-questions.…”
Section: Two Types Of Genetic Interventionmentioning
confidence: 99%