2020
DOI: 10.1016/j.electstud.2020.102157
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Gender quotas and placement mandates in open and closed lists: Similar effects, different mechanisms

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Cited by 7 publications
(6 citation statements)
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“…It is unclear, however, if party elites similarly marginalize women. More broadly, our findings complement work on placement mandates (Corrêa and Chaves, 2020; Jankowski and Marcinkiewicz, 2019; Schmidt, 2009). In countries with open-list systems, where political parties rank candidates but voters can disturb the list, receiving a higher rank increases the likelihood of electoral success (Mustillo and Polga-Hecimovich, 2020).…”
Section: Discussionsupporting
confidence: 71%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…It is unclear, however, if party elites similarly marginalize women. More broadly, our findings complement work on placement mandates (Corrêa and Chaves, 2020; Jankowski and Marcinkiewicz, 2019; Schmidt, 2009). In countries with open-list systems, where political parties rank candidates but voters can disturb the list, receiving a higher rank increases the likelihood of electoral success (Mustillo and Polga-Hecimovich, 2020).…”
Section: Discussionsupporting
confidence: 71%
“…In countries with open-list systems, where political parties rank candidates but voters can disturb the list, receiving a higher rank increases the likelihood of electoral success (Mustillo and Polga-Hecimovich, 2020). Since party elites regularly rank women lower than men, it reduces their likelihood of winning office (Corrêa and Chaves, 2020).…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Various studies demonstrate very strong ballot position effects under open-list PR, meaning that most candidates are elected based on the order in which they appear on the ballot as many voters simply select the first or a highly ranked candidate on the list (e.g., Däubler and Rudolph, 2020). Corrêa and Chaves (2020) demonstrate that due to these effects, placement mandates for women are just as effective under open-list PR as under closed-list PR. and strategies of the selectorate under PR.…”
Section: Candidate Selection and Proportional Representationmentioning
confidence: 96%
“…Such a spectrum of choice is inexistent under the most widely used alternative rule, namely closed‐list PR. Once the latter is applied, a gender quota, as long as it is accompanied by a requirement that female candidates are represented among those featuring in high list positions (placement mandates), brings an inevitable, purely ‘mechanical’ increase in the proportion of women holding elected office (e.g., Corrêa & Chaves 2020). Under PR with preferential voting, ‘cultivating a personal vote’ (Carey & Shugart 1995) is crucial.…”
Section: Contentious Effects Of Legislated Candidate Quotas In Preferential Voting Systemsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Thus, being ranked high does not automatically guarantee winning elected office, and being ranked low does not always lead to an electoral loss. In fact, there are good reasons to argue that the typically high correlations between candidates’ list rankings and the numbers of preferential votes are largely spurious; some of the studies focusing on random or quasi‐random candidate order indicate that in high‐salience, high‐information elections to national parliaments, the impact of list position on a candidate's electoral success is weak (Ortega Villodres 2003; Lutz 2010, but see Corrêa & Chaves 2020 for an inventive non‐experimental comparison suggesting a somewhat stronger effect) 1 . This makes legislated quota effects sensitive to numerous contextual factors, far beyond the mere ‘mechanics’ of quota regulations.…”
Section: Contentious Effects Of Legislated Candidate Quotas In Preferential Voting Systemsmentioning
confidence: 99%