Gender differences in the use of high-variance strategies in tournament competition

Vandegrift, Donald; Brown, Paul

doi:10.1016/j.socec.2005.07.028

Cited by 53 publications

(30 citation statements)

References 33 publications

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“…This effect, however, is entirely due to the fact that women are doing worse with respect to the assigned task suggesting that it is the individual's ability to perform a particular task and not gender per se that crucially affects the reaction to competition: poor performers significantly increase their cheating behavior under competition. In a similar experiment, Vandegrift and Brown (2005) find that in a simple decision task, women exhibit significantly lower forecasting skills than men. Once these differences in forecasting skills are controlled for, men and women are equally likely to adopt a high-variance, i.e.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 87%

Gender differences in competitiveness: Empirical evidence from professional distance running

Frick

2011

Labour Economics

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 87%

Gender differences in competitiveness: Empirical evidence from professional distance running

Frick

2011

Labour Economics

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“…Hannan, Krishnan, and Newman (2008) also report that when competition participants are remunerated on the basis of a tournament scheme they will perform better than when they are remunerated on the basis of an individual compensation. Vandegrift and Brown (2005) however, have found that females are more risk‐averse than males and thus they normally adopt fewer strategies that could lead to tournament competition.…”

Section: Literature Review and Hypotheses Developmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

Gender, Top Management Compensation Gap, and Company Performance: Tournament versus Behavioral Theory

Vieito

2011

Corporate Governance

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Manuscript Type: EmpiricalResearch Question/Issue: This study is among the first to investigate the impact of gender on the relationship between the compensation gap of the CEO and Vice-Presidents on company performance, testing if companies managed by a female CEO or a male CEO follow tournament or behavioral theory. Tournament theory suggests that a large compensation gap between CEO and company Vice-Presidents (VPs) leads to higher company performance; behavioral theory states that higher performance may be achieved with a small compensation gap between CEO and VPs. Additionally the study also investigates if companies managed by a female CEO perform better, or not, than those managed by a male CEO, and if the factors that explain the compensation gap between CEO and VPs in these two groups of companies are the same, or not. Data for the investigation emanated from the USA during the period 1992 to 2004. Research Findings/Insights: The results reflect something quite new in the area -on average, companies managed by a female CEO perform better, and have a smaller compensation gap between the CEO and VPs than companies managed by a male CEO. In companies managed by a female CEO, a smaller difference in the total compensation gap between CEO and Vice-Presidents leads, on average, to higher company performance, however, when the CEO is a male, a higher compensation gap is required to obtain higher company performance. The results provide empirical support that the behavioral theory is predominant in companies managed by a female whereas tournament theory is predominant in companies managed by a male. Theoretical/Academic Implications: The paper fills an important gap in the existing literature by providing econometric evidence that males and females CEOs have a different impact on the relationship between CEO and VPs compensation gap and company performance, and that it is not indifferent to choosing a male or a female CEO in terms of company performance. Practitioner/Policy Implications: This study offers an insight to practitioners and policy makers suggesting that gender influences the relationship between the CEO and Vice-Presidents compensation gap and company performance. Boards may be able to improve company performance if they limit the compensation gap between CEO and VPs when the CEO is a female and extend it, when it is a male.

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“…Wozniak et al (2010), Healy and Pate (2011)) as well as by other studies using different designs (see e.g. Vandegrift and Brown (2005), Falk (2011), Price (2012), Buser (2012), and Garratt et al (2013)). Another strand of this literature studies the question whether women and men react differently to competitive payment schemes such as rank order tournaments.…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 73%

Gender differences in competition and sabotage

Dato

Nieken

2014

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may AbstractWe study the differences in behavior of males and females in a two-player tournament with sabotage in a controlled lab experiment. Implementing a real-effort design and a principal who is paid based on the agent's output, we find that males and females do not differ in their achievements in the real effort task but in their choice of sabotage. Males select significantly more sabotage leading to an on average higher winning probability but not to higher profits. If the gender of the opponent is revealed before the tournament, males increase their performance in the real effort task especially if the opponent is female. The gender gap in sabotage is persistent. We discuss possible explanations for our findings and their implications.

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Gender differences in the use of high-variance strategies in tournament competition

Cited by 53 publications

References 33 publications

Gender differences in competitiveness: Empirical evidence from professional distance running

Gender differences in competitiveness: Empirical evidence from professional distance running

Gender, Top Management Compensation Gap, and Company Performance: Tournament versus Behavioral Theory

Gender differences in competition and sabotage

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