Garbage, Recycling, and Illicit Burning or Dumping

Fullerton, Don; Kinnaman, Thomas C.

doi:10.1006/jeem.1995.1032

Cited by 263 publications

(31 citation statements)

References 8 publications

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“…However, policy instruments focusing only on input use, such as primary/virgin materials taxes cannot generate the optimal amount of disposal unless combined with a tax or subsidy on consumption . Fullerton and Kinnaman (1995) also show that other sources must also be taxed to achieve the first best solution when it comes to recycling. Söderholm (2011) concludes that in cases where optimal policy instruments are not feasible, virgin taxes could play a role, particularly if they are complemented by downstream instruments to facilitate material recycling as well as the abolishing of harmful subsidies to virgin material extraction.…”

Section: Input Taxesmentioning

confidence: 94%

“…An extension of the seminal Fullerton and Kinnaman (1995) model was developed in this project to analyse the effects and policy implications under asymmetric information. The result suggests that asymmetric information lead to adverse selection in terms of lower efforts in sorting by recyclers resulting in inefficient recycling rates due to lower quality of the waste plastic supplied.…”

Section: Economic Policy Instruments For Plastic Wastementioning

confidence: 99%

“…As the models on policy instruments for waste management have not yet analysed asymmetric information, the Fullerton and Kinnaman (1995) model was, in this project, extended to waste plastics with different quality levels. The result showed that asymmetric information between recyclers and manufacturers lead to adverse selection with inefficient effort levels in sorting (lower quality levels of the waste plastic supplied) and lower recycling rates than efficient level.…”

Section: Asymmetric Information In Recycling Marketsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…by provision of kerbside recycling and the availability of nearby community recycling facilities. A tax or charge on garbage collection with no convenient recycling option available may instead result in increased illegal disposal of garbage (Kinnaman and Fullerton, 1995). Hence a recycling infrastructure that makes recycling possible and reduces the households' time and inconvenience costs associated with recycling may reduce any adverse effects of economic instruments due to high monitoring and enforcement costs.…”

Section: Policy Mixes Of Recycling Programs and Economic Instrumentsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…unit pricing. In several theoretical papers deposit and refund schemes are found to be the best instruments to internalize the private and external cost of waste generation and disposal (Dobbs, 1991;Dinan, 1993;Atri and Schellberg, 1995;Fullerton and Kinnaman, 1995;and Ferrara, 2003;Kinnaman, 2010). The reason is that a deposit and refund system is an incentive mechanism covering both source reduction and recycling ensuring that resources (efforts) are allocated efficiently .…”

Section: Deposit and Refund Systemsmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 4 more Smart Citations

Economic policy instruments for plastic waste

Hennlock¹,

Castell-Rüdenhausen²,

Wahlström³

et al. 2015

TemaNord

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Section: Input Taxesmentioning

confidence: 94%

Section: Economic Policy Instruments For Plastic Wastementioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Asymmetric Information In Recycling Marketsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Policy Mixes Of Recycling Programs and Economic Instrumentsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Deposit and Refund Systemsmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 3 more Smart Citations

Economic policy instruments for plastic waste

Hennlock¹,

Castell-Rüdenhausen²,

Wahlström³

et al. 2015

TemaNord

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One Without the Other? Behavioural and Incentive Policies for Household Waste Management

Kirakozian

2017

Environmental Economics and Sustainability

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Environmental taxation in the natural resource extraction sector: is it a good idea?

Söderholm

2006

Eur. Env.

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The purpose of this paper is to analyze the economics of taxing virgin raw materials for environmental reasons. The theoretical discussion is general in scope but empirically we focus on the case of aggregate taxation in three European countries. The motives for environmental taxation of aggregates are mixed, and not all motives find strong support in the economics literature. For instance, the conservation motive may be valid if a relevant market failure can be identified, but, in the presence of a well defined owner of the resource, resource scarcity is often not a sufficient condition for policy intervention. Under some conditions a tax levied per ton of aggregates extracted may be motivated by the presence of environmental externalities at the extraction stage. Still, such a tax provides no direct incentives to reduce the relevant externalities, since the only way of avoiding the tax is to reduce production. In this respect the UK tax appears to be particularly inefficient; it uses one policy instrument to address a number of different environmental externalities at the extraction stage (noise, dust, visual intrusion, loss of amenity and damage to biodiversity), and it is uniform across quarries although the associated externalities are likely to be highly site specific. Overall the paper concludes that taxing output or use typically represents a ‘second‐best’ policy alternative, which could be used when, for instance, the monitoring of non‐point‐source emissions and/or efficient property rights regimes are hard to implement. The fact that virgin resource taxes often address rather diffuse (not to say unimportant) environmental problems may however make them hard to promote effectively on the political arena. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment.

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Garbage, Recycling, and Illicit Burning or Dumping

Cited by 263 publications

References 8 publications

Economic policy instruments for plastic waste

Economic policy instruments for plastic waste

One Without the Other? Behavioural and Incentive Policies for Household Waste Management

Environmental taxation in the natural resource extraction sector: is it a good idea?

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