Gang rule: Understanding and Countering Criminal Governance

Abstract

Gangs govern millions worldwide. Why rule? and how do they respond to states? Many argue that criminal rule provides protection when states do not, and that increasing state services could crowd gangs out. We began by interviewing leaders from 30 criminal groups in Medellín. The conventional view overlooks gangs’ indirect incentives to rule: governing keeps police out and fosters civilian loyalty, protecting other business lines. We present a model of duopolistic competition with returns to loyalty and show under what conditions exogenous changes to state protection causes gangs to change governance levels. We run the first gang-level field experiment, intensifying city governance in select neighborhoods for two years. We see no decrease in gang rule. We also examine a quasi-experiment. New borders in Medellín created discontinuities in access to government services for 30 years. Gangs responded to greater state rule by governing more. We propose alternatives for countering criminal governance.

Broken windows policing and crime: Evidence from 80 Colombian cities

“…Latin America is a region plagued with criminal organizations controlling retail drug markets, collecting extortion, and regulating other forms of crimes such as theft and homicides. Our results are consistent with this idea, as we only see effects in places with low to moderate organized crime (e.g., Blattman et al, 2021a;Dell, 2015;Magaloni et al, 2020). These results suggest policing strategies should follow the local criminal context.…”

“…tically significant-as we are already testing too many coefficients at once, but overall, this result is consistent with criminal organizations planning their activities more systematically relative to disorganized criminals (e.g., Blattman et al, 2021a).…”

“…Also, Dell (2015) finds that crackdowns in cartel strongholds in Mexico displace violence to other cities. Finally, Blattman et al (2021a) find that intensifying state presence in gang territories in Medellín does not crowd criminal rule out, probably due to a strategic response by gangs to state actions.…”

“…Blattman et al (2021a), for instance, document how street gangs in Medellín are part of an elaborate, hierarchical system. These groups coordinate their responses to state action.…”

Humanizing Security through Action‐oriented Research in Latin America

“…The limitations of the security model in Medellín have become apparent (Doyle, 2019; Humphrey and Valverde, 2017). Local gangs and criminal organizations in Medellín, as in other cities such as Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, still have strong influence in marginalized communities despite increased state intervention, not only because they exercise violent forms of social ordering and conflict management, but because they have inserted themselves in the provision of local services (Abello Colak and Guarneros‐Meza, 2014; Blattman et al., 2021; Davila, 2018; Feltran, 2020). Additionally, while drugs trafficking is still a driver of insecurity, other forms of criminality have grown, such as extortion (Bedoya, 2017), local drugs selling, recruitment of adolescents and young men, and sexual exploitation of young children and adolescents (Abello Colak and van der Borgh, 2018; Alcaldía de Medellín, 2018).…”