Gamson's Law versus non-cooperative bargaining theory

Fréchette, Guillaume; Kagel, John H.; Morelli, Massimo

doi:10.1016/j.geb.2004.11.003

Cited by 81 publications

(43 citation statements)

References 15 publications

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“…They too find that coalition member shares are more equal than predicted under the SSPE, and that a majority of, but not all, allocations are for minimal winning coalitions. In a series of papers, Fréchette et al (2005aFréchette et al ( , 2005bFréchette et al ( , 2005c) study the Baron-Ferejohn model and compare it with demand bargaining (Morelli 1999) and Gamson's Law (Gamson 1961), using closed amendment rule procedures and an infinite time horizon. Their main findings are that there is support for the qualitative implications of the Baron-Ferejohn model, but serious deviations from the point predictions of the model, as proposer power is far less than predicted under the stationary subgame perfect equilibrium.…”

Section: Extent Of Agreement On Proposalsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Veto power in committees: an experimental study

2010

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Veto power consists of the right of one or more players to unilaterally block decisions but without the ability to unilaterally secure their preferred outcome. Our experiment shows that (i) committees with a veto player take longer to reach decisions (are less efficient) and generate less consensus than without a veto player, (ii) veto power substantially enhances proposer's power, and (iii) non-veto players are substantially more willing to compromise than veto players. We relate our results to the theoretical literature on the impact of veto power as well as to concerns about the impact of veto power in real-life committees.

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Section: Extent Of Agreement On Proposalsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Veto power in committees: an experimental study

2010

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“…He shows that a belief-based learning model based on Friedman and Cheung (1997) can account for these trends. Frechette et al (2005aFrechette et al ( , 2005b report results from an experiment designed to test the separate e¤ects of bargaining power and recognition power, in a legislature with di¤erent sized parties who have strong party discipline (i.e., always vote as a block). Bargaining power is measured directly in terms of the size of the voting block.…”

Section: Bf Experimentsmentioning

confidence: 99%

6. Experiments in Political Economy

Palfrey

2016

The Handbook of Experimental Economics, Volume Two

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“…This is not true empirically, a finding first published over 40 years ago. 6 Nonetheless, GL itself has proved extraordinarily robust to replication, even when different cabinet portfolios are assigned very 4 (Bassi 2013;Carroll and Cox 2007a;Laver et al 2011;Warwick and Druckman 2006;Falcó-Gimeno and Indridason 2013) 5 Browne and Franklin 1973;Browne and Frendreis 1980;Fréchette et al 2005b;Gamson 1961;Laver et al 2011;Schofield and Laver 1985;Warwick and Druckman 2006;Snyder et al 2005) different empirical weights. 7 On the other side of the paradox we find canonical alternating offers models of legislative bargaining, with an intellectual pedigree traceable to Rubinstein (1982), adapted to legislative bargaining by Baron and Ferejohn (1989 .…”

Section: The Paradoxmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The second proposition is stated ex post, knowing the identity of the formateur. The propositions are therefore not contradictory because they apply in 7 Browne and Franklin 1973;Browne and Frendreis 1980;Fréchette et al 2005b;Gamson 1961;Laver et al 2011;Schofield and Laver 1985;Warwick and Druckman 2006;Snyder et al 2005) 8 Snyder et al 2005) 9 (Snyder et al 2005: 982) 10 (Snyder et al 2005: 992) different settings, but this highlights a critical distinction between ex ante and ex post models of cabinet portfolio distribution. The paradox is therefore both simple and striking.…”

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confidence: 99%

Cabinet Formation and Portfolio Distribution in European Multiparty Systems

Cutler¹,

Marchi²,

Gallop³

et al. 2014

Brit. J. Polit. Sci.

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Government formation in multiparty systems is of self-evident substantive importance, and the subject of an enormous theoretical literature. Empirical evaluations of models of government formation tend to separate government formation per se, from the distribution of key government payoffs such as cabinet portfolios between members of the government that forms. Models of government formation are necessarily specified ex ante, absent any knowledge of the government that forms. Models of the distribution of cabinet portfolios are typically, though not necessarily, specified ex post, given knowledge of the identity of some government "formateur" or even of the full partisan composition of the eventual cabinet. This disjunction lies at the heart of a notorious contradiction between predictions of the distribution of cabinet portfolios made by canonical models of legislative bargaining, and the robust empirical regularity of proportional portfolio allocations -"Gamson's Law". We resolve this contradiction by specifying and estimating a joint model of cabinet formation and portfolio distribution, which for example predicts ex ante which parties will receive zero portfolios rather than taking this as given ex post.We conclude that canonical models of legislative bargaining do add to our ability to predict government membership, but that portfolio distribution between government members conforms robustly to a proportionality norm … we suggest because portfolio distribution follows the much more difficult process of policy bargaining in the typical government formation process.Cabinet formation and portfolio distribution in European multi-party systems / 2

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Gamson's Law versus non-cooperative bargaining theory

Cited by 81 publications

References 15 publications

Veto power in committees: an experimental study

Veto power in committees: an experimental study

6. Experiments in Political Economy

Cabinet Formation and Portfolio Distribution in European Multiparty Systems

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