Gaming the Regulator: A Survey

Jamasb, Tooraj; Nillesen, Paul; Pollitt, Michael G.

doi:10.1016/j.tej.2003.09.008

Cited by 28 publications

(10 citation statements)

References 13 publications

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“…Whether opting for non‐convex benchmark strategies would have a mitigating impact on the gaming of the regulator remains to be seen. Jamasb, Nillesen and Pollitt (2003) offer a survey among regulators on these vulnerability issues in yardstick competition and Jamasb, Nillesen and Pollitt (2004) provide some examples of manipulating benchmarking models in regulatory practice.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Incentive Regulation and the Role of Convexity in Benchmarking Electricity Distribution: Economists Versus Engineers

Grifell‐Tatjé

Kerstens

2008

Ann Public Coop Econ

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This note illustrates the potential impact of the specification of a convex production technology on establishing minimal costs compared to the use of a non-convex technology when benchmarking electricity distributors. This methodological reflection is mainly motivated by recent engineering literature providing evidence for non-convexities in electricity distribution. An empirical illustration using non-parametric specifications of technology illustrates this main point using a sample of Spanish electricity distribution firms earlier analysed in Grifell-Tatjé and Lovell (2003). * Comments of a referee are gratefully acknowledged. We also thank Knox Lovell for helpful suggestions. The usual disclaimer applies.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Incentive Regulation and the Role of Convexity in Benchmarking Electricity Distribution: Economists Versus Engineers

Grifell‐Tatjé

Kerstens

2008

Ann Public Coop Econ

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“…Nevertheless, the self-regulatory aspect in the Dutch sector seems to take its toll as the productivity change is barely larger than 1 in the last period (the middle period shows even a negative productivity change). The different directions of the productivity growth could originate from attempts to 'game' the regulator (Jamasb et al, 2003(Jamasb et al, , 2004. The three sectors are characterized by the presence of professional associations with strong powers over the sector and over the politicians.…”

Section: Gaming the Stakeholdersmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…To our best knowledge, this is a first similar decomposition for water utilities in the Low Countries. Finally, we interpret and link the Malmquist decompositions to a 'gaming' framework (Jamasb et al, 2003(Jamasb et al, , 2004. Indeed, water utilities, as any economic agent, have their own agenda and act and react to incentives.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Gaming in a benchmarking environment. A non-parametric analysis of benchmarking in the water sector

Witte

Marques

2011

Water Policy

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This paper discusses the use of benchmarking in general and its application to the drinking water sector. It systematizes the various classifications on performance measurement, discusses some of the pitfalls of benchmark studies and provides some examples of benchmarking in the water sector. After presenting in detail the institutional framework of the water sector of the Belgian region of Flanders (without benchmarking experiences), Wallonia (recently started a public benchmark) and the Netherlands (introduced already in 1997 a public benchmark), we non-parametrically measure the productivity gains by the use of a dynamic Malmquist index. The three regions, each at a different stage of the benchmarking circle, exhibit different performance trends. The 'carrot' and the 'stick' of benchmarking seem to offer an effective incentive to trigger performance. In addition, the Malmquist decompositions provide some evidence on the 'gaming' of the stakeholders by the water utilities.

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“…Therefore, the frontier-based methods can be viewed as "collective benchmarking" methods. Within this framework, an attempt by a firm to influence the terms of regulatory contract (for example, model variables or specifications) has also implications for other firms (see Jamasb et al, 2003;.…”

Section: Select and Or Create Efficient Comparatorsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Reference models and incentive regulation of electricity distribution networks: An evaluation of Sweden's Network Performance Assessment Model (NPAM)

Jamasb

Pollitt

2008

Energy Policy

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The worldwide electricity sector reforms have led to a search for alternative and innovative approaches to regulation to promote efficiency improvement in the natural monopoly electricity networks. A number of countries have used incentive regulation models based on efficiency benchmarking of the electricity network utilities. While most regulators have opted adopted parametric and non-parametric frontier-based methods of benchmarking some have used engineering designed 'reference firm' or 'norm' models for the purpose. This paper examines the incentive properties and other related aspects of the norm model NPAM used in regulation of distribution networks in Sweden and compares these with those of frontier-based benchmarking methods. We identify a number of important differences between the two approaches to regulation benchmarking that are not readily apparent and discuss their ramifications for the regulatory objectives and process.

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Gaming the Regulator: A Survey

Cited by 28 publications

References 13 publications

Incentive Regulation and the Role of Convexity in Benchmarking Electricity Distribution: Economists Versus Engineers

Incentive Regulation and the Role of Convexity in Benchmarking Electricity Distribution: Economists Versus Engineers

Gaming in a benchmarking environment. A non-parametric analysis of benchmarking in the water sector

Reference models and incentive regulation of electricity distribution networks: An evaluation of Sweden's Network Performance Assessment Model (NPAM)

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