Cancer cells cooperate in many of the hallmarks of cancer, within the tumor and with stromal cells in the microenvironment, via the secretion of diffusible factors. This cooperation cannot be explained simply as the collective action of cells for the benefit of the tumor, because non-cooperative clones can constantly invade and free-ride on the growth factors produced by the cooperative cells. A full understanding of cooperation among cancer cells requires methods and concepts from evolutionary game theory, which has been used successfully in other areas of biology to understand similar problems, but underutilized in cancer research. Game theory can provide insight into the stability of cooperation among cancer cells and the design of evolutionproof therapies by disrupting this cooperation.
Cooperation in cancerCells within a tumor compete for space and resources, but also cooperate with one another, by secreting diffusible factors that promote tumor growth and invasion [1][2][3][4][5] . Cooperative interactions between cancer cells and with their microenvironment are essential for cancer progression and crucial in driving resistance to therapies [6][7][8] . Many of the molecules responsible for these interactions, their genes and the signalling pathways they activate are known, but why cells within a tumor cooperate remains unexplained. The "why" here relates to the adaptive advantage 9-11 of cooperation: what selective advantage does a cell gain by cooperating (producing a growth factor)?The idea that cells within a tumor cooperate for the benefit of the tumor -an appealing and apparently reasonable explanation -is a logical fallacy that has a parallel in the history of evolutionary ecology, where it is known as the "group selection" argument 12 -the idea, popular until the 1960's that the behaviour of individuals is driven by the success of their group or species, a logic that evolutionary biologists now agree is flawed [12][13][14] . A mutation making an individual cheat, for instance by free-riding on shared resources produced by other cooperative individuals, would confer a reproductive advantage to the cheating individual and its descendants. Thus, its type would increase in frequency in the population over time, irrespective of the consequences for the population in the long term -leading to what is generally referred to as "tragedy of the commons" 15 . In the original example, a group of herders whose cows graze a common land have a selfish short-term interest in putting as many cows as possible onto the land, even if the commons is damaged as a result, because the