Game theory meets network security and privacy

Manshaei, Mohammad Hossein; Zhu, Quanyan; Alpcan, Tansu; Bacşar, Tamer; Hubaux, Jean-Pierre

doi:10.1145/2480741.2480742

Cited by 671 publications

(349 citation statements)

References 102 publications

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“…26. The strategic component of attributing cyberattacks has been studied in the context of single attacks against specific systems using game theory (27)(28)(29)(30), but these models do not account for the larger sociopolitical landscape. This broader context has been studied qualitatively using a variety of models (15,31,32).…”

Section: Significancementioning

confidence: 99%

Strategic aspects of cyberattack, attribution, and blame

Edwards

Furnas

Forrest

et al. 2017

Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A.

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Cyber conflict is now a common and potentially dangerous occurrence. The target typically faces a strategic choice based on its ability to attribute the attack to a specific perpetrator and whether it has a viable punishment at its disposal. We present a game-theoretic model, in which the best strategic choice for the victim depends on the vulnerability of the attacker, the knowledge level of the victim, payoffs for different outcomes, and the beliefs of each player about their opponent. The resulting blame game allows analysis of four policy-relevant questions: the conditions under which peace (i.e., no attacks) is stable, when attacks should be tolerated, the consequences of asymmetric technical attribution capabilities, and when a mischievous third party or an accident can undermine peace. Numerous historical examples illustrate how the theory applies to cases of cyber or kinetic conflict involving the United States,

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Section: Significancementioning

confidence: 99%

Strategic aspects of cyberattack, attribution, and blame

Edwards

Furnas

Forrest

et al. 2017

Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A.

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“…That game model will be given as the output of KMS to the GCU. Then GCU takes prescribed sequence of action as per that game model 8 .…”

Section: Operational Flowmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…( ) 8,6 is the prescribed  -NOSP. It recommends for the user to be less aggressive as he is more affective while the administrator to be quite aggressive.…”

Section: Average User (Au)mentioning

confidence: 99%

On a Generic Security Game Model

Shandilya¹,

Shiva²

2017

IJCNS

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To protect the systems exposed to the Internet against attacks, a security system with the capability to engage with the attacker is needed. There have been attempts to model the engagement/interactions between users, both benign and malicious, and network administrators as games. Building on such works, we present a game model which is generic enough to capture various modes of such interactions. The model facilitates stochastic games with imperfect information. The information is imperfect due to erroneous sensors leading to incorrect perception of the current state by the players. To model this error in perception distributed over other multiple states, we use Euclidean distances between the outputs of the sensors. We build a 5-state game to represent the interaction of the administrator with the user. The states correspond to 1) the user being out of the system in the Internet, and after logging in to the system; 2) having low privileges; 3) having high privileges; 4) when he successfully attacks and 5) gets trapped in a honeypot by the administrator. Each state has its own action set. We present the game with a distinct perceived action set corresponding to each distinct information set of these states. The model facilitates stochastic games with imperfect information. The imperfect information is due to erroneous sensors leading to incorrect perception of the current state by the players. To model this error in perception distributed over the states, we use Euclidean distances between outputs of the sensors. A numerical simulation of an example game is presented to show the evaluation of rewards to the players and the preferred strategies. We also present the conditions for formulating the strategies when dealing with more than one attacker and making collaborations.

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“…In this work, they have used a specific network model, and assumed knowledge of topology and sessions. A similar approach for random networks with random connections could shed valuable insights on scaling behavior of anonymous communication The work [7,8] presented a framework to classify DoS attacks into single-and multi-source attacks. In addition to using packet headers to classify the attacks, they develop two new approaches: initial ramp-up transients and spectral analysis.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Optimal Game Theory for Network Security using IPDRS Engine

P¹,

Nadu²

2015

International Journal of Advanced Research in Computer and Comm

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Abstract:With the tremendous growth of network technology, network attackers are also rationally increased to disrupt the activities and hacking the data from the network users by the intruder. To provide the security from the intruder is most important one. Many researchers were proposed a different approach for providing security they does not tackle the problem, it leads an untruthful in the network. In existing system they propose a game based intrusion request and response process by game play of header node to access the data by their correct play, from this if the real header play it in wrong method means all the client user under the header also suffer from the access of the data. To tackle this issue we enhanced the game theory based on the individual play in the network to avoid the suffering of misplayed game played by the header using the IPDRS Engine.

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Game theory meets network security and privacy

Cited by 671 publications

References 102 publications

Strategic aspects of cyberattack, attribution, and blame

Strategic aspects of cyberattack, attribution, and blame

On a Generic Security Game Model

Optimal Game Theory for Network Security using IPDRS Engine

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