Game Theory-Based Bidding Strategy in the Three-Level Optimal Operation of an Aggregated Microgrid in an Oligopoly Market

Abstract

This paper proposes a new framework for the optimal operation of a microgrid aggregator (MGA) that participates in an oligopoly electricity market. This aggregator obtains an optimal bidding (power and price) strategy for a multigrid (MG) system, i.e., a community MG. Consequently, the granted quantity, i.e., power in the electricity market, is deployed to optimally schedule the MG's resources to meet demand. As such, as per three-level optimization, the independent system operator (ISO) clears the market with the goal of maximizing the social welfare in the first stage and determining the hourly market price as well as players' credited power. In the second-level optimization process, the players select the optimal coefficient supply function equilibrium according to the power granted from the market. In third-level optimization, an optimal scheduling for MGs' resources and demand would be obtained according to the won power in the market to maximize the aggregator profit. In addition, a price-taker MGA is simulated for comparison with the price-maker MGA to highlight the advantage of the proposed technique. Furthermore, a bidding strategy based on game theory is proposed to obtain the optimal price and power of the oligopoly market players and maximize all players' profits. Finally, a test system including three generators is created to evaluate the performance of the devised bidding strategy. The results show that the proposed bidding strategy can optimally calculate the focal point of the Nash equilibrium (NE) in the oligopoly electricity market.INDEX TERMS game theory, microgrid operations, oligopoly, optimization, bidding I. INTRODUCTION A. OPERATION OF THE MICROGRID