2015
DOI: 10.1007/s10640-015-9955-4
|View full text |Cite
|
Sign up to set email alerts
|

Game Theory and Environmental and Resource Economics–In Honour of Alfred Endres

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...
1

Citation Types

0
1
0

Year Published

2016
2016
2024
2024

Publication Types

Select...
4
2

Relationship

1
5

Authors

Journals

citations
Cited by 8 publications
(1 citation statement)
references
References 45 publications
0
1
0
Order By: Relevance
“…The essence of global carbon emission rights allocation is the game of national interests. 49 , 50 Countries can play a greater role in reducing carbon emissions by forming cooperative alliances, making the overall interests better than without cooperation. Allocation with the help of cooperative game theory can not only guarantee collective rationality and pursue efficiency, fairness and justice in the allocation of carbon emission rights, but also avoid vicious competition that may be caused by non-cooperative game in multi-country situations, 51 , 52 that is, countries sacrifice global interests for independent interests.…”
Section: Theoretical Frameworkmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The essence of global carbon emission rights allocation is the game of national interests. 49 , 50 Countries can play a greater role in reducing carbon emissions by forming cooperative alliances, making the overall interests better than without cooperation. Allocation with the help of cooperative game theory can not only guarantee collective rationality and pursue efficiency, fairness and justice in the allocation of carbon emission rights, but also avoid vicious competition that may be caused by non-cooperative game in multi-country situations, 51 , 52 that is, countries sacrifice global interests for independent interests.…”
Section: Theoretical Frameworkmentioning
confidence: 99%