Game-Theoretic Learning and Allocations in Robust Dynamic Coalitional Games

Designing an Allocation Mechanism for a Coalitional Production Game

“…The control variable 𝐮(𝑡) is the vector of control values such that at every time 𝑡, before knowing the real demand, we can adjust the forecast values of the coalitions by subtracting the control value. From (18) we can rewrite the aggregate coalitional excess as follows:…”

“…Due to this uncertainty, it is necessary to design an allocation mechanism that is robust and stable in the long term. Other works related to the design of robust and stable allocation mechanism are [17,18].…”

Distributed payoff allocation in coalitional games via time varying paracontractions

“…In this direction, Lehrer (2003) presented an allocation process which converges to the CORE (or if this is empty, to a least-CORE). Smyrnakis et al (2019) also consider an allocation process but under noisy observations and dynamic environment. Bauso et al (2014) provide conditions for an averaging process, with dynamics subject to controls and adversarial disturbances, under which the allocations converge to consensus in the desired set.…”