Game-theoretic analysis of trade-in services in closed-loop supply chains

Quan, Yuting; Hong, Jiangtao; Song, Jingpu; Leng, Mingming

doi:10.1016/j.tre.2021.102428

Cited by 28 publications

(8 citation statements)

References 45 publications

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“…In contrast with earlier papers that have focused on return policies and environmental aspects, Quan et al [52] presented a novel perspective by addressing the interplay between trade-in services and direct sales in a two-period CLSC game involving a manufacturer and a retailer. That study explores two scenarios: one that is manufacturer-operated (Scenario M) and another featuring retailer-outsourced trade-in services (Scenario R).…”

Section: Game-theoretic Modelsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Closing the Gap: A Comprehensive Review of the Literature on Closed-Loop Supply Chains

Zengin,

Amin,

Zhang

2024

Logistics

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Background: Sustainable closed-loop supply chains have emerged as viable answers to supply chain problems. They can handle environmental damages (e.g., waste) and related social impacts. Closed-loop supply chains (CLSCs) are forward and reverse supply chain networks that have gained popularity in recent years. Recovery options such as reusing, remanufacturing and recycling can be considered in CLSCs. Methods: This paper provides a comprehensive evaluation of CLSC journal papers published between 2020 and the present. This study examines and synthesizes 54 papers from major publications in this area, covering a wide range of themes and approaches. This paper aims to respond to the following key questions: (i) What are the current trends and challenges in CLSC research, and how have they evolved since previous literature review papers? (ii) What key variables and objectives have been studied in recent CLSC research, and how have they been operationalized? (iii) What are the gaps and limitations in current CLSC research? To our knowledge, other literature review papers in this field have covered older papers, and recent papers have been ignored in them. Another research contribution of this paper is the taxonomy of it. Results: This review article highlights some developing themes and research gaps in the CLSC literature and makes recommendations for further study. Conclusions: This paper provides a comprehensive review of papers on closed-loop supply chain networks.

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Section: Game-theoretic Modelsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Mixed-integer linear programming (MILP) [14,15,18,20,21,26] Stochastic programming (SP) [30,53] Meta-heuristics [22] Stackleberg game [45,47,49,51,52] Nash game [50] Nash-bargaining game model [46] Variational Inequality Method (IV) [24] Hybrid techniques SP, MILP [44] Robust probabilistic, two-phase fuzzy…”

Section: Single Techniquementioning

confidence: 99%

Closing the Gap: A Comprehensive Review of the Literature on Closed-Loop Supply Chains

Zengin,

Amin,

Zhang

2024

Logistics

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“…Xiao et al [43] also considered implementing a trade-in program through the retail channel and the direct channel for the existing customers and found that the retailer would implement the trade-in policy voluntarily in a dual-channel case when the market size of the existing customers is relatively small. Quan et al [37] studied a two-period setting in which a manufacturer sells products through a retail channel and implements the trade-in program, and customers who purchase products in period 1 and can trade in their used products in period 2 and found that both firms usually prefer to provide the trade-in service.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Product rollover and direct sales decisions in dual-channel supply chains

Hsieh

Putera

2022

RAIRO-Oper. Res.

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This study investigates product rollover and direct sales decisions in a supply chain with one fashion manufacturer and one retailer when two style generations are sequentially introduced to the market over two periods. The retailer serves as the exclusive sales channel during the introductory period of a style generation. Both the retailer and manufacturer are capable of selling the old style generation in the second period. The retailer adopts dual rollover if she sells the old style generation, and single rollover if she does not. We develop a two-stage game to explore the chain members’ equilibrium decisions while accounting for the manufacturer’s cost inefficiency in direct sales and consumers’ mental account deficit. We find that the manufacturer’s cost inefficiency has double-edged effects and can offset the negative effect of consumers’ mental account deficit on the introduction of a new style generation. Furthermore, a win-win outcome can be achieved when the manufacturer with an intermediate level of cost inefficiency engages in direct sales and consumers have high valuations of the old style generation or when the manufacturer with significant cost inefficiency does not engage in direct sales.

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“…There also exist some studies that pay attention to trade‐in issues from the perspective of supply chains. These studies focus mainly on who should provide the trade‐in service in supply chains (Quan et al, 2021; Tang et al, 2021; Xiao, 2017), dual‐channel trade‐in rebate decisions (Fan et al, 2022; Feng et al, 2019; Li et al, 2018; Ma et al, 2013; Xiao et al, 2020), and green technologies adoption with trade‐ins (Dou & Choi, 2021). It is worth noting that the above studies mainly considered the trade‐in program offered by a single supply chain member (i.e., manufacturer or retailer).…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…On the other hand, the manufacturers may decide their trade‐in rebates independently or cooperatively. Although there is a growing literature on trade‐in rebate strategies either provided, respectively, by the manufacturer or the retailer (e.g., Dou & Choi, 2021; Quan et al, 2021; Tang et al, 2021; Xiao, 2017) or implemented in a competitive market (Desai et al, 2016; Zhu et al, 2016), to our knowledge, the vertical joint trade‐in rebate strategy and horizontal cooperation in trade‐ins remain unexplored.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Optimal joint trade‐in rebate strategies in a retailer‐led supply chain

Tang

Ding

2022

Manage Decis Econ

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This study investigates the joint trade-in rebate strategies in a supply chain with independent manufacturers selling substitutable products via a dominant retailer. We model their interplay as a Stackelberg game and analyze their joint trade-in rebate decisions. We find that the differentiated trade-in rebate scheme is better for the retailer, and the manufacturers cooperating in making their trade-in rebate decisions can achieve win-win results in most cases. However, replacement consumers could benefit from the retailer's uniform trade-in rebate scheme and the manufacturers not cooperating in their trade-in decisions. The latter is always more beneficial to the environment. | INTRODUCTIONTrade-in programs are extensively used in durable product markets, such as household electrical appliances, automobiles, electronics, and technology industries (Agrawal et al., 2016;Ray et al., 2005). In a trade-in program, trade-in rebates are commonly regarded as a special discount firms offer to the replacement consumers for a new product.Consequently, trade-in programs can serve as essential strategic leverage to boost sales of new products (Xiao, 2017). For instance, in highly saturated markets such as refrigerators or electric heaters, the percentage of replacement purchases in the United States equals 70%-80% of annual sales (Ray et al., 2005). Similarly, approximately 57% of all new car sales are through trade-ins in the automobile industry (Zhu et al., 2008). It has been revealed that trade-ins play a crucial role in increasing the purchasing frequency (Desai et al., 2016), helping firms to remain competitive (Li & Xu, 2015), and reducing the environmental impact (Vedantam et al., 2021).

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Game-theoretic analysis of trade-in services in closed-loop supply chains

Cited by 28 publications

References 45 publications

Closing the Gap: A Comprehensive Review of the Literature on Closed-Loop Supply Chains

Closing the Gap: A Comprehensive Review of the Literature on Closed-Loop Supply Chains

Product rollover and direct sales decisions in dual-channel supply chains

Optimal joint trade‐in rebate strategies in a retailer‐led supply chain

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