Game-theoretic analysis of Stackelberg oligopoly with arbitrary rank reflexive behavior of agents

Geraskin, Mikhail I.

doi:10.1108/k-12-2016-0351

Cited by 8 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 36 publications

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“…In some extent, similar characteristic of this process can be observed within the structure of classical economic games in the literature, such as the Gibbons (1992) descriptions, Rubinstein (1982) and Sobel and Takahashi (1983) sequential bargaining models and Von Stackelberg (1934) model of duopoly. Some recent game approaches have similar characteristics with the present modeling (Brangewitz and Gamp, 2013;Bolton and Karagözo glu, 2016;Geraskin, 2017;Nepomuceno and Costa, 2014;Santos et al, 2017;Wu and Wang, 2017) The negotiation will be characterized as a dynamic negotiation of complete and perfect information, which means that not only each negotiator has the complete information on the payoff function of his/her counterpart, but also the entire history behind the negotiation so far (strategies adopted, interactions, moves and choices) is of common knowledge (Gibbons, 1992). The timing of the bargain goes as follows:…”

Section: Sequential Bargains With Asymmetric and Mutual Negotiation Knowledgementioning

confidence: 87%

Modeling sequential bargains and personalities in democratic deliberation systems

Nepomuceno¹,

Moura

Costa

2018

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Purpose This paper aims to introduce a negotiation support system (NSS) with a theoretical modeling that considers the aspects of human personality and negotiator’s behavior to assist the decision-making of public managers and stakeholders in democratic bargaining processes and support social-efficient outcomes. Design/methodology/approach A game theoretical modeling of public participatory negotiations characterized by complete and perfect information is explored with the inclusion of personality aspects and negotiation styles. The importance of the negotiation knowledge disclosure in the sequential bargains of participative budgeting is highlighted by an experiment with 162 state-owned companies’ managers and graduate students to present the contribution of the system’s applicability. Findings A considerable number of Pareto-efficient deliberation agreements are obtained with few interactions when the negotiation strategies and the personality aspects of opponents and stakeholders are freely available (a symmetry in the public negotiation knowledge). In addition to the set of Pareto-efficient agreements, those with the best social outcome (i.e. that maximize the group satisfaction despite individual losses) are observed when the informational tool for personality and negotiation style inference is enabled. Originality/value Many scholars argue for Pareto-efficient allocation instead of equal divisions of resources within participative democracies and public governance. This work provides a new system with an empirical application and theoretical modeling which may support those arguments based on the nonverbal negotiation aspects.

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Section: Sequential Bargains With Asymmetric and Mutual Negotiation Knowledgementioning

confidence: 87%

Modeling sequential bargains and personalities in democratic deliberation systems

Nepomuceno¹,

Moura

Costa

2018

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“…The model describes a leadership which allows the firm that dominates the market to decide its price first and in which follower firms subsequently make decisions to maximize profits. There are a number of works related to Stackelberg model with different adjustments for costs and capacities (e.g., Okuguchi, 1976Okuguchi, , 1979Howroyd & Rickard, 1981;Shapiro, 1989;Zhang and Zhang, 1996;Schoonbeek, 1997;Geraskin, 2017;Gong & Zhou, 2018;Prokop and Karbowski, 2018). In our study, we consider that a homogenous product market is characterized by a Stackelburg duopoly with one leader and one follower.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Stackelberg-Nash Equilibrium and Perfect Competition in the Solow-Uzawa Growth Model

Zhang

2022

Lect. Econ.

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This study introduces Stackelberg-Nash equilibrium to neoclassical growth theory. It attempts to make neoclassical economic growth theory more robust in modelling the complexity of market structures. The model is constructed within the framework of the Solow-Uzawa two-sector model. The economy is composed of two sectors. The final goods sector is the same as in the Solow one-sector growth model which is characterized by perfect competition. The consumer goods sector is the same as the consumer goods sector in the Uzawa model but is characterized by Stackelberg duopoly. We model household behavior with Zhang’s concept of disposable income and utility. The model endogenously determines profits of duopoly which are equally distributed among the homogeneous population. We build the model and then identify the existence of an equilibrium point through simulation. We conduct comparative static analyses of some parameters. We also compare the economic performance of the traditional Uzawa model and the model with the Stackelberg-Nash equilibrium. We conclude that the imperfect competition increases national output, national wealth, and utility level in comparison to perfect competition.

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“…When the best responses of firms are obtained in challenging situations, equilibrium is established. Consequently, when the equilibrium is obtained in the oligopoly markets, game theories and Nash equilibrium define this as the stable state of the market (Geraskin, 2017).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

A dynamic differential oligopoly game with sticky price and advertising

Raoufinia

Baradaran

Shahrjerdi

2019

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Purpose The purpose of this study is to analyze comparatively the properties of open-loop and closed-loop equilibria in a dynamic oligopoly model with price dynamics and reflexive behavior of market agents. Design/methodology/approach To consider dynamic competitive markets, the authors focus on a differential game theory in oligopolistic structures, using analytical models to illustrate how advertising effort, good differentiation and price stickiness interact simultaneously in the open-loop and the closed-loop Nash equilibria. The comparative assessment of these equilibria obtains some significant results. Findings An optimization model that enriches the continuous time is presented. Under the open-loop and the closed-loop, Nash equilibrium showed an increase in the total output, advertising in price stickiness and promotional efficiency, while there was a decrease in product differentiation and advertising promotional efficiency. However, the open-loop equilibrium levels are larger than the closed-loop equilibrium. Under the closed-loop information, the long-run equilibrium was faster than the opened-loop in a dynamic oligopoly. The graphical illustration was used to present the behavior of the model parameters. Practical implications This study helps managers to choose an appropriate price and advertising adjustment to maximize profit. The obtained results may help firms to make the smart decision and may provide managers the valuable tool for making decisions in the competitive market environments. Originality/value This is a first attempt to analyze a dynamic oligopoly in the differentiated market environment. It considers a joint action of the output and advertising in shaping the closed-loop and the open-loop equilibria with N competitors in a dynamic competitive setting.

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Game-theoretic analysis of Stackelberg oligopoly with arbitrary rank reflexive behavior of agents

Cited by 8 publications

References 36 publications

Modeling sequential bargains and personalities in democratic deliberation systems

Modeling sequential bargains and personalities in democratic deliberation systems

Stackelberg-Nash Equilibrium and Perfect Competition in the Solow-Uzawa Growth Model

A dynamic differential oligopoly game with sticky price and advertising

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