Game-theoretic analysis of opportunistic spectrum sharing with imperfect sensing

Abstract

We consider the strategic behavior of secondary users (SUs) in a cognitive radio system where SUs opportunistically share a single primary user (PU) band over a coverage area. The service of an SU can be interrupted by a PU in a preemptive manner, and the interrupted SU may abandon the system or wait until the PU band is sensed available. In the latter case, if spectrum sensing errors occur, they will cause misdetections and false alarms which impact the system's performance heavily. In this paper, we model this problem as a retrial queueing system with server breakdowns and recoveries in which the interrupted SUs are treated as retrial customers. They will retry for using the PU band after some period of time due to interruptions or misdetections. The arrival of a PU during service of an SU is modeled as a server breakdown, and the recovery time is equivalent to the service time of this PU. We focus on the behavior of arriving SUs who can make decisions on whether to join the system or to balk based on a natural cost structure and the delays caused by PUs' interruptions, which can be studied as a non-cooperative game. The equilibrium and optimal strategies of SUs are both derived. Furthermore, to bridge the gap between the individually and socially optimal strategies, a novel strategy of imposing an admission fee on SUs to join the retrial group is proposed. Finally, some numerical examples are presented to show the effect of several key parameters on the system performance.

Technical Issues on Cognitive Radio-Based Internet of Things Systems: A Survey

“…Many approaches can be employed to select the optimal PU network. PSO, genetic optimization and game theory are among the best approaches to be used for this purpose [8], [90].…”

“…Therefore, power allocation approaches have to be employed to realize this objective. Among those approaches, point interior approach [88], WF algorithm [86], [101], and game theory [90]. The point interior method is generally employed for linear and non-linear convex optimization problems.…”

Retrial Queueing Models: A Survey on Theory and Applications

“…From this point of view, appropriate retrial queueing models might be useful for cognitive systems. Wang et al [127,128] use some simple M/M/1/1 retrial queueing models to study strategic behav-ior of secondary users in cognitive networks. Dudin et al [50] propose a multiclass retrial queueing model for cognitive systems.…”

On the Retrial-Queuing Model for Strategic Access and Equilibrium-Joining Strategies of Cognitive Users in Cognitive-Radio Networks with Energy Harvesting

“…Chang et al [10] discussed individual and social strategies, and pricing strategy by considering only one base station for serving primary and secondary users. Secondary users are dismissed in the system when a primary user arrives.Through game theory, the decision-making process of whether secondary users would join the queue is studied in this paper.Wang et al [11] examined opportunistic spectrum sharing with imperfect sensing from a game-theory perspective. In this, they modelled the system with constant retrial and server breakdowns, where secondary users followed the carrier-sense multiple-access (CSMA) protocol with imperfect spectrum sensing.…”

“…Due to this, secondary users search for both spectrum holes for opportunistic access and for the occupied spectrum of a primary user to harvest energy. The authors in [6][7][8][9][10][11]13,14] reported equilibrium strategies in CR networks with different environments. However, no study considered energy harvesting in CR networks.…”