Proceedings of the 19th ACM Symposium on Access Control Models and Technologies 2014
DOI: 10.1145/2613087.2613097
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Game theoretic analysis of multiparty access control in online social networks

Abstract: Existing online social networks (OSNs) only allow a single user to restrict access to her/his data but cannot provide any mechanism to enforce privacy concerns over data associated with multiple users. This situation leaves privacy conflicts largely unresolved and leads to the potential disclosure of users' sensitive information. To address such an issue, a MultiParty Access Control (MPAC) model was recently proposed, including a systematic approach to identify and resolve privacy conflicts for collaborative d… Show more

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Cited by 49 publications
(31 citation statements)
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References 34 publications
(42 reference statements)
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“…In particular, researchers have analyzed conflict resolution from a game-theoretic point of view and proposed negotiation protocols based on game-theoretic concepts such as the Nash equilibrium [Hu et al 2014a;Rajtmajer et al 2016;Squicciarini et al 2010;Such and Rovatsos 2016;Xiao and Tan 2012]. For instance, Squicciarini et al [2010] use the Clarke-Tax model and game theory in the context of an auction to resolve policy conflicts by selecting the privacy policy that maximizes social utility.…”
Section: Governancementioning
confidence: 99%
“…In particular, researchers have analyzed conflict resolution from a game-theoretic point of view and proposed negotiation protocols based on game-theoretic concepts such as the Nash equilibrium [Hu et al 2014a;Rajtmajer et al 2016;Squicciarini et al 2010;Such and Rovatsos 2016;Xiao and Tan 2012]. For instance, Squicciarini et al [2010] use the Clarke-Tax model and game theory in the context of an auction to resolve policy conflicts by selecting the privacy policy that maximizes social utility.…”
Section: Governancementioning
confidence: 99%
“…Authors in [24][25] highlight the risks of sharing private data and propose appropriate trade-off mechanisms where the user is informed about the usage of his data and an incentive equal to the privacy cost is offered in return. In [26] a new Multi-party Access Control (MPAC) model was proposed that uses Nash Equilibrium to obtain a unique solution for sharing data with multiple parties and identify an appropriate incentive. The difficulty with these approaches is that, they are highly influenced by the truthfulness and greediness of the user which can entice them into affecting the originality of the data.…”
Section: Related Workmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…These proposals provide an elegant analytic framework proposing negotiation protocols to study the problem and the solutions that can be obtained using well-known gametheoretic solution concepts such as the Nash equilibrium. However, as shown in [45], these proposals may not always work well in practice, as they do not capture the social idiosyncrasies considered by users in the real life when they face multi-party privacy conflicts, and users' behaviour is far from perfectly rational as assumed in these game-theoretic approaches -e.g., refer to [3], [4].…”
Section: Related Workmentioning
confidence: 99%