Game analysis of Chinese stakeholders in collective forest rights system reform

Wu, Sina; Shao-wen, Zhang

doi:10.1080/10042857.2014.953777

Cited by 4 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 0 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…However, participants do not know which specific type belongs to the other people involved (Li et al, 2019). Moreover, because there is an action sequence, later actors can observe the behavior of the first players and obtain information concerning the players first, thus confirming or correcting their actions toward the first players (Wu and Zhang, 2014).…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Research on subsidy standards for public welfare forests based on a dynamic game model—Analysis of a case in Jiangxi, China

Ding

Shao-wen

et al. 2023

Front. For. Glob. Change

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

To understand the behavior of the main participants in public welfare forest projects, this article constructs a “forest farmers–local government–central government” dynamic game model by setting the game scope and game principles. The game payment matrix and game equilibrium solutions show that (1) expanding the value of ecological products in the forest to improve operating income will increase the participation of forest farmers; (2) the local government's enthusiasm for leading public welfare forest projects is mainly influenced by the positive effects of planting and management costs, which provides the theoretical basis for central government to intervene in regional ecological governance; (3) when the central government leads public welfare forest projects, the enthusiasm of the local government for afforestation is positively influenced by the central government's subsidies. Finally, based on the game equilibrium solution, the expected results of forest farmers' operational income are calculated using the case of Jiangxi, which confirms the importance of increasing forest farmers' operational income.

show abstract

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Research on subsidy standards for public welfare forests based on a dynamic game model—Analysis of a case in Jiangxi, China

Ding

Shao-wen

et al. 2023

Front. For. Glob. Change

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Local governments, for the sake of economic growth performance, require local supervisory departments to relax environmental regulation. Local supervisory departments are forced to cooperate with local government decisions for the sake of political promotion and department interest, which may deviate from the central government's goals in regulating carbon emissions [59]. In view of this, supervisory departments can choose either "strict supervision" or "relaxed supervision" strategy.…”

Section: Game Situation and Assumptionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Incentive-compatible mechanism for manufacturing carbon emission supervision under carbon control policies in China

Liang,

Lv,

Zhao

2024

PLoS ONE

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Enhance performance in manufacturing carbon emission (MCE) reduction has become a widespread consensus and a necessary part, which cannot be achieved without the joint participation of manufacturing enterprises and supervisory departments. Accordingly, how to coordinate the interests of both sides and design a reasonable incentive-compatible mechanism becomes an urgent task at present. Considering the two subsidy funding channels of peer funds and government finance, this study applies the evolutionary game model to analyze feasible schemes for designing incentive-compatible mechanism of MCE supervision, discusses and simulates the realistic scenarios and influencing factors of incentive-compatible mechanism under the non-subsidized and subsidized schemes. The results show that MCE supervision is in an incentive-incompatible state under the non-subsidized incentive scheme, while in a constrained incentive-compatible state under the subsidized incentive scheme. With the increase of peer funds and penalty coefficient or the decrease of subsidy coefficient, the period of MCE supervision to reach an incentive-compatible state becomes shorter. However, a lower peer fund and penalty coefficient or a higher subsidy coefficient will contribute to a state of incentive-incompatible or a periodic cycle state of "incentive-compatible → incentive-incompatible →incentive-compatible→…" in the MCE supervision.

show abstract

“…Nansi Lake is connected together by four lakes: Nanyang Lake, Dushan Lake, Zhaoyang Lake and Weishan Lake, with a total area of 1266 km 2 [4]. There is a second-dam at the waist of lake which divided the lake into the Upper Lake and Lower Lake.…”

Section: Overview and Monitoring Sites Of Nansi Lake Basinmentioning

confidence: 99%

Spatial-Temporal Comparative Analysis of Water Environmental Quality Features in Nansi Lake Basin

Xiao

Wang

et al. 2013

AMR

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Based on monitoring data from 2006 to 2010,the surface water environmental quality features in Nansi Lake Basin were analyzed at temporal and spatial scale. The results show that the water quality in Nansi Lake basin has improved during the annual period, the wet period and dry period. In terms of CODCr and NH3-N, the proportion of water with quality of class I to III has increased, while the proportion of water with quality that was inferior to class V has decreased. The proportion of water with quality of class Ito III in NH3-N was lager than that in CODCr. The Nansi Lake basin water quality in the wet period was slightly better than that in the annual period, while the water quality in dry period was slightly worse than that in the annual period. Judging from the spatial scale, the water quality of control units in the west of Nansi Lake basin is better than those in the east of Nansi Lake basin. The control units of Guangfu River and Laoyun River in Jining were the most seriously polluted areas.

show abstract

Game analysis of Chinese stakeholders in collective forest rights system reform

Cited by 4 publications

References 0 publications

Research on subsidy standards for public welfare forests based on a dynamic game model—Analysis of a case in Jiangxi, China

Research on subsidy standards for public welfare forests based on a dynamic game model—Analysis of a case in Jiangxi, China

Incentive-compatible mechanism for manufacturing carbon emission supervision under carbon control policies in China

Spatial-Temporal Comparative Analysis of Water Environmental Quality Features in Nansi Lake Basin

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About