Game Analysis and Simulation of the River Basin Sustainable Development Strategy Integrating Water Emission Trading

Liu, Liang; Feng, Cong; Zhang, Hongwei; Zhang, Xuehua

doi:10.3390/su7054952

Cited by 7 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 40 publications

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“…For example, Kim [22] and Sice et al [23] use SD to simulate the dynamic and complex evolutionary process of the hybrid strategy game model and duopoly game model. Liu et al [24] simulate an evolutionary game model of two enterprise populations' dynamics and stability in the decision-making behavior process. It can be seen that SD provides an effective aid for studying the complex dynamic process of evolutionary games under incomplete information conditions.…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The System Dynamics (SD) Analysis of the Government and Power Producers’ Evolutionary Game Strategies Based on Carbon Trading (CT) Mechanism: A Case of China

Xin-gang

Zhang

2018

Sustainability

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Climate warming caused by carbon emissions is one of the most serious problems faced by human beings, and the carbon trading (CT) mechanism is an effective way to promote carbon emission reduction and achieve green and low-carbon development. Scholars have mainly studied the impact of CT on the energy economy system, and few scholars studied the game process and behavior strategies of government and power producers in the implementation of a CT mechanism. This paper will fill this gap. This paper firstly constructs the evolutionary game model of government and power producers based on CT, and then simulates the evolutionary process of game behavior strategies by establishing a system dynamics (SD) model, and finally studies the influence of government controllable key factors on system stability. The combination of evolutionary game and SD in our study not only clearly reveals the complex and dynamic evolution process of game models under bounded rationality, but also provides a qualitative and quantitative simulation platform for analyzing the dynamic game process between government and power producers. The results show that: (1) There is no evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) in the game system between government and power producers under CT, and the system evolution is characterized by periodicity; (2) When the government implements dynamic subsidies or punitive measures, the mixed strategy of the game system has ESS; (3) Reducing the unit subsidy and raising the unit fine can both promote the participation of power producers in CT, but the former increases the probability of government supervision; thus, it is best to increase the fines when the government makes strategic adjustments, followed by reducing subsidies.

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Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The System Dynamics (SD) Analysis of the Government and Power Producers’ Evolutionary Game Strategies Based on Carbon Trading (CT) Mechanism: A Case of China

Xin-gang

Zhang

2018

Sustainability

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“…Evolutionary game theory is an application of the mathematical framework of game theory to the dynamics of animal conflicts (including, of course, the conflicts in which people engaged) [32,33]. Following the development of evolutionary game theory, it has been widely used to analyse industrial transfer [34,35], pollution control [36][37][38][39][40][41], and policy-making [41][42][43].…”

Section: Evolutionary Game Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Evolutionary Game Analysis of the Stress Effect of Cross‐Regional Transfer of Resource‐Exhausted Enterprises

Wang

Yang

et al. 2019

Complexity

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is paper analyses the stress e ect of cross-regional transfer of resource-exhausted enterprises from eastern China to central and Western China. A tripartite evolutionary game model including the central government, the local government of the operation recipient region, and the resource-exhausted transfer enterprises is established under the assumption of limited rationality. By analysing the evolutionary equilibrium and using MATLAB, for example, analysis, the relationship between equilibrium probability and various parameters, as well as the key in uencing factors of equilibrium strategy were explored. e research shows, rst, that the degree of punishment imposed by the central government on the local governments, the implementation of regulation by the local governments, and the amount of rewards/punishments implemented by the local governments for transfer enterprises are the key factors a ecting evolutionary stability. Second, it shows that the local governments' penalty for transfer enterprises has a signi cant impact on the convergence speed of enterprises' strategic choice to "Completely Control Pollution." Finally, from the perspective of the relationships between the central government and the local governments, as well as with transfer enterprises, countermeasures and suggestions are put forward to e ectively prevent the stress e ect of the cross-regional transfer behaviour of resource-exhausted enterprises.

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“…The academic community has applied the evolutionary game model to environmental protection research and made great progress. For example, Liu et al (2015) developed an evolutionary game model of two enterprise populations' dynamics and stability for decision-making. By building a system dynamics model, they simulated the aforementioned game and found that the initial choice of strategy was essential to the final result.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…By building a system dynamics model, they simulated the aforementioned game and found that the initial choice of strategy was essential to the final result. They concluded that it is important to check the saddle point and external factors [28]. Zhao et al (2016) established an evolutionary game model to investigate the responses of enterprises to carbon-reduction policies.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Does Whistleblowing Work for Air Pollution Control in China? A Study Based on Three-party Evolutionary Game Model under Incomplete Information

Yang

2019

Sustainability

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During China's air pollution campaign, whistleblowing has become an important way for the central government to discover local environmental issues. The three parties involved in whistleblowing are: the central government environmental protection departments, the local government officials, and the whistleblowers. Based on these players, this paper has constructed an Evolutionary Game Model under incomplete information and introduced the expected return as well as replicator dynamics equations of various game agents based on analysis of the game agents, assumptions, and payoff functions of the model in order to study the strategic dynamic trend and stability of the evolutionary game model. Furthermore, this paper has conducted simulation experiments on the evolution of game agents' behaviors by combining the constraints and replicator dynamics equations. The conclusions are: the central environmental protection departments are able to effectively improve the environmental awareness of local government officials by measures such as strengthening punishment on local governments that do not pay attention to pollution issues and lowering the cost of whistleblowing, thus nurturing a good governance and virtuous circle among the central environmental protection departments, local government officials, and whistleblowers. Based on the study above, this paper has provided policy recommendations in the conclusion.

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Game Analysis and Simulation of the River Basin Sustainable Development Strategy Integrating Water Emission Trading

Cited by 7 publications

References 40 publications

The System Dynamics (SD) Analysis of the Government and Power Producers’ Evolutionary Game Strategies Based on Carbon Trading (CT) Mechanism: A Case of China

The System Dynamics (SD) Analysis of the Government and Power Producers’ Evolutionary Game Strategies Based on Carbon Trading (CT) Mechanism: A Case of China

Evolutionary Game Analysis of the Stress Effect of Cross‐Regional Transfer of Resource‐Exhausted Enterprises

Does Whistleblowing Work for Air Pollution Control in China? A Study Based on Three-party Evolutionary Game Model under Incomplete Information

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