Gambling on the unconscious: A comparison of wagering and confidence ratings as measures of awareness in an artificial grammar task

Dienes, Zoltán; Seth, Anil K.

doi:10.1016/j.concog.2009.09.009

Cited by 138 publications

(132 citation statements)

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“…Congruently, many researchers now seem to agree that subjective measures are better tuned to the measurement of conscious awareness than objective tasks or free verbal reports (see: Dienes & Seth, 2010;Koch & Preuschoff, 2007;Sandberg et al, 2010;Wierzchoń , Asanowicz, Paulewicz, & Cleeremans, 2012). However, there is continuing disagreement on what is in fact measured with a particular subjective scale.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In other words, PAS and CS are often considered as pure measures of awareness of the stimulus rather than as measures of awareness of knowing that one is aware of the stimuli (Dretske, 2006;so-called ''judgement knowledge''). In contrast, confidence ratings (CR, Dienes & Seth, 2010) and post-decision wagering (PDW, Persaud, McLeod, & Cowey, 2007;Ruffman, Garnham, Import, & Connolly, 2001) are more explicitly directed towards assessing participants' certainty in their judgements (that is awareness of possessing experience-related knowledge relevant to the judgement rather than the direct experience itself). In confidence ratings, certainty is expressed through a scale describing the lowest ratings as ''not confident at all'' and the highest ratings as ''very confident''.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Subjective measures of consciousness, such as confidence ratings (Dienes & Perner, 2004;Dienes & Seth, 2010) or the Perceptual Awareness Scale (Ramsøy & Overgaard, 2004) have now become very popular in studies dedicated to investigating conscious awareness. Such subjective scales are used to investigate awareness in subliminal perception (Sandberg, Timmermans, Overgaard, & Cleeremans, 2010), attentional blink (Sergent & Dehaene, 2004), blindsight (Overgaard, Fehl, Mouridsen, Bergholt, & Cleeremans, 2008) and implicit learning (Dienes & Seth, 2010), to list just a few examples.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Such subjective scales are used to investigate awareness in subliminal perception (Sandberg, Timmermans, Overgaard, & Cleeremans, 2010), attentional blink (Sergent & Dehaene, 2004), blindsight (Overgaard, Fehl, Mouridsen, Bergholt, & Cleeremans, 2008) and implicit learning (Dienes & Seth, 2010), to list just a few examples. The main reason for this resurgent and now widespread use of subjective measures is that they afford easy quantification whilst retaining the very feature one is interested in when attempting to measure conscious experience, namely its subjective character (Overgaard, Jensen, & Sandberg, 2010).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Different subjective awareness measures demonstrate the influence of visual identification on perceptual awareness ratings

Wierzchoń

Paulewicz²,

Asanowicz

et al. 2014

Consciousness and Cognition

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a b s t r a c tWe compare four subjective awareness measures in the context of a visual identification task and investigate quantitative differences in terms of scale use and correlation with task performance. We also analyse the effect of identification task decisions on subsequent subjective reports. Results show that awareness ratings strongly predict accuracy for all scale types, although the type of awareness measure may influence the reported level of perceptual awareness. Surprisingly, the overall relationship between awareness ratings and performance was weaker when participants rated their awareness before providing identification responses. Furthermore, the Perceptual Awareness Scale was most exhaustive only when used after the identification task, whereas confidence ratings were most exhaustive when used before the identification task. We conclude that the type of subjective measure applied may influence the reports on visual awareness. We also propose that identification task decisions may affect subsequent awareness ratings.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Different subjective awareness measures demonstrate the influence of visual identification on perceptual awareness ratings

Wierzchoń

Paulewicz²,

Asanowicz

et al. 2014

Consciousness and Cognition

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“…These "metadecisions" are mediated by confidence judgments, the degree to which decision makers consider that their choices are likely to be correct. Confidence judgments can be severely distorted: People may lack confidence when responding correctly and reciprocally, be very confident of incorrect responses (1)(2)(3)(4)(5)(6). In classic perceptual tasks followed by a confidence report, one can distinguish between (i) the ability to correctly discriminate between stimulus alternatives, referred to as type-I performance, and (ii) the ability of confidence judgments to discriminate between correct and incorrect responses, referred to as type-II performance (2,7).…”

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confidence: 99%

Distinct patterns of functional brain connectivity correlate with objective performance and subjective beliefs

Barttfeld

Wicker

McAleer

et al. 2013

Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A.

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The degree of correspondence between objective performance and subjective beliefs varies widely across individuals. Here we demonstrate that functional brain network connectivity measured before exposure to a perceptual decision task covaries with individual objective (type-I performance) and subjective (type-II performance) accuracy. Increases in connectivity with type-II performance were observed in networks measured while participants directed attention inward (focus on respiration), but not in networks measured during states of neutral (resting state) or exogenous attention. Measures of type-I performance were less sensitive to the subjects' specific attentional states from which the networks were derived. These results suggest the existence of functional brain networks indexing objective performance and accuracy of subjective beliefs distinctively expressed in a set of stable mental states.D ecisions often bear upon other decisions, as when we seek a second medical opinion before undergoing a risky surgical intervention. These "metadecisions" are mediated by confidence judgments, the degree to which decision makers consider that their choices are likely to be correct. Confidence judgments can be severely distorted: People may lack confidence when responding correctly and reciprocally, be very confident of incorrect responses (1-6). In classic perceptual tasks followed by a confidence report, one can distinguish between (i) the ability to correctly discriminate between stimulus alternatives, referred to as type-I performance, and (ii) the ability of confidence judgments to discriminate between correct and incorrect responses, referred to as type-II performance (2, 7). The objective of this work is to investigate whether functional brain networks distinctively covary with type-I and type-II performance.Network organization of resting state functional brain activity can account for individual differences in several cognitive functions (8-13). These studies rely on networks derived from the "resting state" (14, 15). Recently, Tang et al. (16) showed the formation of distinct brain networks in the maintenance of three welldefined mental states that vary the focus of attention: resting, alert, and meditation states (16). Here we capitalize on this idea, deriving functional brain networks for each individual, varying the focus of attention toward internal states (interoception, focus on respiration), external stimulus (exteroception), or remaining in a resting state of free thought.Interoception (generically defined as the ability to detect subtle changes in bodily systems, including muscles, skin, joints, and viscera) (17), is closely related to metacognition of agency (18,19). We reasoned that this may more generally reflect a partially overlapping system regulating attention to internal states, including interoception (focus on body systems) and metacognitive ability (focus on internal thoughts and feelings). Hence, our working hypothesis is that increases in functional connectivity with the quality of subject...

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‘Put Your Money Where Your Mouth Is!’: Effects of Streaks on Confidence and Betting in a Binary Choice Task

Studer

Limbrick‐Oldfield

Clark

2014

Behavioral Decision Making

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Human choice under uncertainty is influenced by erroneous beliefs about randomness. In simple binary choice tasks, such as red/black predictions in roulette, long outcome runs (e.g. red, red, red) typically increase the tendency to predict the other outcome (i.e. black), an effect labeled the “gambler's fallacy.” In these settings, participants may also attend to streaks in their predictive performance. Winning and losing streaks are thought to affect decision confidence, although prior work indicates conflicting directions. Over three laboratory experiments involving red/black predictions in a sequential roulette task, we sought to identify the effects of outcome runs and winning/losing streaks upon color predictions, decision confidence and betting behavior. Experiments 1 (n = 40) and 3 (n = 40) obtained trial-by-trial confidence ratings, with a win/no win payoff and a no loss/loss payoff, respectively. Experiment 2 (n = 39) obtained a trial-by-trial bet amount on an equivalent scale. In each experiment, the gambler's fallacy was observed on choice behavior after color runs and, in experiment 2, on betting behavior after color runs. Feedback streaks exerted no reliable influence on confidence ratings, in either payoff condition. Betting behavior, on the other hand, increased as a function of losing streaks. The increase in betting on losing streaks is interpreted as a manifestation of loss chasing; these data help clarify the psychological mechanisms underlying loss chasing and caution against the use of betting measures (“post-decision wagering”) as a straightforward index of decision confidence. © 2014 The Authors. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.

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Gambling on the unconscious: A comparison of wagering and confidence ratings as measures of awareness in an artificial grammar task

Cited by 138 publications

References 34 publications

Different subjective awareness measures demonstrate the influence of visual identification on perceptual awareness ratings

Different subjective awareness measures demonstrate the influence of visual identification on perceptual awareness ratings

Distinct patterns of functional brain connectivity correlate with objective performance and subjective beliefs

‘Put Your Money Where Your Mouth Is!’: Effects of Streaks on Confidence and Betting in a Binary Choice Task

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