Gains Versus Costs in Legislative Bargaining

Christiansen, Nels; Jhunjhunwala, Tanushree; Kagel, John H.

doi:10.2139/ssrn.3137841

Cited by 3 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 26 publications

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“…Among other results, it is found that stakeholder allocations with past arbitration experience differ more from the impartial ideal than the stakeholder allocations by agents without arbitration experience. Two investigations, which are again somewhat closer to our own set-up are [ 24–25 ]. In [ 24 ], a Baron-Ferejohn model of multilateral legislative bargaining [ 26 ] is examined.…”

Section: Introductionsupporting

confidence: 54%

“…Two investigations, which are again somewhat closer to our own set-up are [ 24–25 ]. In [ 24 ], a Baron-Ferejohn model of multilateral legislative bargaining [ 26 ] is examined. In the gains version, three players decide how to split a given sum of money under the majority rule.…”

Section: Introductionsupporting

confidence: 54%

“…Under majority voting, in a group of three agents, all the loss was heaped on one member, in a group of five, either one agent had to carry the total loss or two members had to bear one half each. Such aspects might have led to different research questions which we do not want to consider here [ 24 – 26 ].…”

Section: The Experimental Set-upmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Against the proportionality principle: Experimental findings on bargaining over losses

Gaertner

Bradley

et al. 2019

PLoS ONE

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The outcomes of bargaining over losses, the subject of this paper, have rarely been studied. But experimental studies of related situations, such as those involving bankruptcies or bequests in which the sum of the legal claims that can be made against a bank or firm or estate are greater than their values, have produced strong support for the proportionality principle. To test whether this principle would find support in other situations involving losses we designed an experimental game in which four players start out with differing initial endowments of real money. They are then informed that a certain amount of this resource has to be given back to the experimenter. How should the loss be shared among the agents? This game was run at different locations and under different treatments over a period of almost three years. We found that the proportionality principle was rarely proposed and even less frequently accepted as a solution to this problem. One of the main reasons for this result was that the two players with the smallest endowments opposed most of the proposals which asked them to contribute at least some positive amount of their own initial resource.

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