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Abstract

The paper explores a theme not well analyzed in Latin America: The military has to govern itself with autonomy by the unique justice and mechanisms of control, even if international law is not obeyed. We explain why all over the democratic world the trends are to limit the autonomy of military justice and to transfer this function to civilian courts. In doing so, we demonstrate the difference between Latin America and democratic countries in Europe, as well as the USA. Autonomous justice means power and special protection for a traditional organization, like the armed forces, which have weapons, political pre-eminence, and social legitimacy. The article intends to draw attention to internal processes to produce order and discipline in barracks, using conventional methods at a time when most armies are not made up of regular or permanent soldiers. Lately, armies look like major enterprises, but military codes have not had sufficient changes to cope with new challenges, such as human rights, gender inclusion, and new demands for more rights and justice. At the same time, terrorism makes the world more dangerous and greater demands are placed on the armed forces, such as rapid decisions sometimes of an unorthodox character. This makes things more difficult for international organizations concerned with justice, especially the rights of civilians not to be tried by military courts.