Fuzzy Q-learning for a multi-player non-cooperative repeated game

Ishibuchi, Hisao; Nakashima, Tomoharu; Miyamoto, H.; Oh, Chi-Hyon

doi:10.1109/fuzzy.1997.619776

Cited by 14 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 3 publications

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“…However, it is not usually a favorable strategy from a social-welfare point of view. To guarantee the social-welfare, the linear pricing scheme [15] is used in literature. In this scheme, the players are forced to pay a penalty proportional to the utilized resources.…”

Section: B Problem Definitionmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Fully Distributed Game Theoretic Approach to Guarantee Self-Coexistence among WRANs

Gardellin

Das

Lenzini

2010

2010 INFOCOM IEEE Conference on Computer Communications Workshops

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Although the proliferation of wireless applications operating in unlicensed spectrum bands has resulted in overcrowding, recent analysis has shown that license bands are still underutilized. Cognitive Radio is seen as the key enabling technology to address the spectrum shortage problem, opportunistically using the spectrum allocated for TV bands. In this paper, we present a novel game theoretic framework that uses the potentialities of the new IEEE 802.22 Standard to guarantee self-coexistence among Wireless Regional Area Networks. We address this problem as a channel assignment problem where each WRAN acquires a chunk of spectrum free of interference in a dynamic and distributed way. Using a novel technique to compute backoff windows, we show that the channel assignment problem can be formulated as a multi-player non-cooperative repeated potential game that converges to a Nash Equilibrium point. We consider each WRAN as a player of our game and we use two different types of utility functions to maximize the spatial reuse and minimize the interference. An extensive simulation study shows that having the interference minimization as objective is not necessarily the best solution with selfish players

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Section: B Problem Definitionmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Fully Distributed Game Theoretic Approach to Guarantee Self-Coexistence among WRANs

Gardellin

Das

Lenzini

2010

2010 INFOCOM IEEE Conference on Computer Communications Workshops

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“…In this section, we briefly explain our market selection game formulated in [10]. Our market selection game is a non-cooperative repeated game with n agents and m markets (e.g., We assume that every agent has a single product to be sold in each round of our game.…”

Section: Problem Formulationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Evolution of game strategies was guided by the fitness value of each strategy evaluated through the execution of the IPD game. In this paper, we examine the evolution of game strategies for a market selection game, which was formulated in our former study [10] as a non-cooperative repeated game with many agents and several markets. An example of our market selection game is shown in Fig.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Evolution of unplanned coordination in a market selection game

Ishibuchi

Sakamoto

Nakashima

2001

IEEE Trans. Evol. Computat.

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This paper examines the evolution of unplanned coordination among independent agents in a market selection game, which is a non-cooperative repeated game with many agents (e.g., 100 agents) and several markets (e.g., five markets). Every agent is supposed to simultaneously choose a single market for maximizing its own payoff obtained by selling its product at the selected market. It is assumed that the market price is determined by a linear decreasing function of the total supply at each market. For example, if many agents choose a particular market, the market price at that market is low. On the contrary, the market price is high if only a small number of agents choose that market. In this manner, the market prices are determined by the actions of all agents. The point of our market selection game is to choose a market with a high market price, i.e., a market that is not chosen by many other agents. In this paper, the evolution of game strategies is performed by localized selection and mutation. A new strategy of an agent is probabilistically selected from its neighbors' strategies by the selection operation or randomly updated by the mutation operation. It is shown that the maximization of each agent's payoff through the genetic operations leads to the unplanned coordination of the market selection where the undesired concentration of agents is avoided. Through computer simulations, the unplanned coordination is compared with the planned global coordination realized by the maximization of the total payoff over all agents. Simulation results show that almost the same average payoff is obtained by these two schemes. That is, the selfish maximization of each agent's payoff through the genetic operations leads to a near-optimal result with respect to the total payoff over all agents. The unplanned coordination of the market selection realized by the evolution is also compared with some simple market selection methods such as a minimum transportation cost strategy, a random selection strategy, and an optimal strategy for the previous actions. Simulation results show that much higher payoff is obtained by the unplanned coordination than those methods.

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“…As shown in the following section. Besides, the power of SU should be adjusted to achieve spectrum sharing [25].…”

Section: T T T T T + =mentioning

confidence: 99%

Self-Coexistence Strategy in Heterogeneous Cognitive Radio Networks

Zhang¹,

Zhang²,

Mei³

et al. 2017

IJCNS

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Different from general cognitive wireless networks, there is no centralized scheduling and management infrastructure among heterogeneous cognitive networks. Multiple cells may operate in the same vicinity resulting in unfair spectrum occupation time (when the cells belong to different industries) and degraded performance of the cellular networks. A distributed self-coexistence mechanism is necessary. In this paper, we take the self-coexistence of multi users in heterogeneous scenarios as the problem of spectrum allocation in non-cooperative mode. Hence we propose Fair Self-Coexistence Strategy (FSCS). In this strategy, not only the fairness of occupation time is considered, but also different competitive priority metric based on Quality of Service (QoS) is adopted. Each cognitive cell independently completes the spectrum allocation process, by use of sensing techniques and perceptual information about neighboring network cells. The simulation experiment results show that our spectrum allocation strategy guarantees the fairness among the heterogeneous secondary networks. And in the resource scarce environment, our strategy can effectively achieve the differentiation competition results.

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Fuzzy Q-learning for a multi-player non-cooperative repeated game

Cited by 14 publications

References 3 publications

A Fully Distributed Game Theoretic Approach to Guarantee Self-Coexistence among WRANs

A Fully Distributed Game Theoretic Approach to Guarantee Self-Coexistence among WRANs

Evolution of unplanned coordination in a market selection game

Self-Coexistence Strategy in Heterogeneous Cognitive Radio Networks

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