Fundamentality and the Existence of God

Abstract

In this article, I seek to assess the extent to which Theism, the claim that there is a God, can provide a true fundamental explanation for the existence of certain entities within the layered structure of reality. More precisely, I assume the cogency of Swinburne's explanatory framework and seek to resituate it within a new philosophical context-that of the field of contemporary metaphysics-which will enable me to develop a true fundamental explanation for the existence of the nonfundamental entities that fill up the various levels of the layered structure of reality. And thus, given the truth of this type of explanation, we will have one more good reason to believe in the existence of God.

Modal Metaphysics and the Existence of God

“…For example, in analysing the 11 I take the terms 'theory' and 'explanation' to be synonymous and I will also alternate between the terms 'parsimony' and 'simplicity' without any change in meaning. Furthermore, in previous work: (Sijuwade 2021c) and (Sijuwade 2021d), I utilised Swinburne's conception of the criterion of simplicity, which states that an explanation is simple if it fewest entities, fewest properties of entities, fewest kinds of entities, fewest kinds of properties, properties that are more readily observable, the fewest separate laws with the fewest terms relating the fewest variables, and the simplest formulation of each law being mathematically simple (Swinburne, 2004, 53). Since the writing of those works, however, I have seen the importance of grounding this important criterion on a more robust conception of parsimony that draws a distinction between ontology and ideology in a manner that is more widespread in contemporary metaphysics.…”

“…In the context of determining the correct grounds for 'theory choice', the justificatory basis on which an explanation is judged to be a correct terminus in explanation -that is, how probable it is that this explanation is a fundamental explanation of a particular entity -centres on the extent to which it has (or can achieve a 'trade-off' between) the specific theoretical (or explanatory) virtues of minimising commitments (at the fundamental level) and maximising explanation of the data at hand. More specifically, this theoretical aim is (plausibly) achieved by a candidate explanation fulfilling the following abductive criteria: 9 9 For the attentive reader, one will notice that the conceptualisation of the abductive criteria that is about to be provided is more fine-tuned and robust than that offered in (Sijuwade 2021c) and (Sijuwade 2021d) by it taking into account -and modifying at certain points -some helpful ideas concerning theory choice that have been proposed by Graham Oppy -and thus which are not to be found in the work of Swinburne. Thus, for a further helpful explanation of the importance of the 'trade-off' between minimising commitments and maximising explanation, see (Oppy, 2019, (i) The criterion of predictive power (ii) The criterion of background knowledge (iii) The criterion of scope (iv) The criterion of parsimony For (i): the criterion of predictive power, this criterion assesses whether the postulated explanation predicts the existence of the entity, when otherwise this event or entity would not be expected to have existed.…”

“…Rather, in this version of modal realism, worlds are indeed causally related, and it is in God's other way of being: as a possible individual that exists at a possible world, that God is 'causally related' to created reality, and thus there is no possibility of modal collapse. However, in a recent article Sijuwade (2021c) has provided a way for God to be located at the standpoint of every world and within every world -as a multilocated entity. This way utilises a modification of Lewis' Concretism.…”

“…For a further explanation of the nature of abductive reasoning, and a comparison of this type of reasoning with that of deductive and inductive reasoning, see (Douven 2021). Furthermore, the argument that features in this article is to be read as an extension of two similar arguments for the existence of God based on the existence of the non-fundamental entities that fill up the layered structure of reality, and the instantiation of the grounding relation that connects the non-fundamental entities within this structure, both of which featured in (Sijuwade 2021c) and (Sijuwade 2021d).…”

Grounding and the Existence of God

“…For a further explanation of the nature of abductive reasoning, and a comparison of this type of reasoning with that of deductive and inductive reasoning, see Douven (2021). Furthermore, the argument that features in this article is to be read as an extension of a similar argument for the existence of God based on the existence of the non-fundamental entities that fill up the layered structure of reality, which featured in Sijuwade (2021c). fundamental explanations of our explanatory target: Priority Monism and Priority Pluralism, in light of their fulfilment of the inductive criteria detailed in section one, with the final conclusion being that Theism is the only explanation that fulfils these criteria-it is the simplest explanation, fitting with our background knowledge, that leads us to expect the data, when otherwise it would not be expected.…”