Fundamental Rights and Constitutional Duels in Europe: An Italian Perspective on Case 269/2017 of the Italian Constitutional Court and Its Aftermath

Abstract

Recently, constitutional courts have come under siege, with scholars criticising them for their abuse of the national (or, according to another terminology, constitutional 1) identity argument. In this sense, Halmai 2 has also blamed the German Bundesverfassungsgericht for providing other constitutional courts (namely the Hungarian one) with a problematic series of techniques by provoking, in this way, a worrying (even dangerous, in his opinion) escalation of constitutional conflict. Moreover, constitutional pluralists have been accused of offering arguments to autocrats and populists to justify violations of the values set out in Article 2. 3 Against this background, the aim of this work is to reflect

War and Peace in the Context of the Multilevel Legal Order for the Protection of the Fundamental Rights of the Persons Requested for the Execution of a European Arrest Warrant

“…In so doing, this judicial response seems capable of promoting dialogue without taming the conflicts surrounding fundamental rights protections". 23 In this model, the Italian Constitutional Court proposes itself as an intermediary -capable of a comprehensive and authoritative overview -between the common judges and the cjeu, in a non-hierarchical communicative process24 characterized by an "interpretative competition"25 on the appropriate standard of protection of fundamental rights. This is also consistent with the shift in the legitimacy of the Constitutional Court, which today increasingly resides in the protection of fundamental human rights.26 From the perspective of criminal lawyers, scrupulous guardians of the patrimony of individual legal guarantees obtained -not without difficulties -over time, this balance deserves appreciation: the involvement of several judicial bodies constitutes the most immediate form of protection of the fundamental rights of individuals.…”

The Constitutional Boundaries of European Fiscal Federalism

“…Most recently, the rather transparent attempt to absorb constitutional identities into the EU legal order under Article 4(2) TEU is credited with provoking the emergence of new 'constitutional identity' jurisprudence in Belgium, 433 and the recentralization of overlapping EU Charter/constitutional claims in the Constitutional Courts of Italy and Austria. 434 In Austria, the VfGH recently asserted that the interpretation of EU rights 'must heed the constitutional traditions of the Member States and therefore the distinct characteristics of the rule of law in the Member States'. 435 In Italy, the Corte constituzionale recently reasserted its jurisdiction to 'ensure that the rights [under the EU Charter] are interpreted in a way consistent with constitutional traditions'.…”

The Constitutional Boundaries of European Fiscal Federalism

“…Most recently, the rather transparent attempt to absorb constitutional identities into the EU legal order under Article 4(2) TEU is credited with provoking the emergence of new 'constitutional identity' jurisprudence in Belgium, 433 and the recentralization of overlapping EU Charter/constitutional claims in the Constitutional Courts of Italy and Austria. 434 In Austria, the VfGH recently asserted that the interpretation of EU rights 'must heed the constitutional traditions of the Member States and therefore the distinct characteristics of the rule of law in the Member States'. 435 In Italy, the Corte constituzionale recently reasserted its jurisdiction to 'ensure that the rights [under the EU Charter] are interpreted in a way consistent with constitutional traditions'.…”