Functions of spontaneous and voluntary future thinking: evidence from subjective ratings

Abstract

Future thinking is defined as the ability to withdraw from reality and mentally project oneself into the future. The primary aim of the present study was to examine whether functions of future thoughts differed depending on their mode of elicitation (spontaneous or voluntary) and an attribute of goal-relatedness (selected-goal-related or selected-goal-unrelated). After producing spontaneous and voluntary future thoughts in a laboratory paradigm, participants provided ratings on four proposed functions of future thinking (self, directive, social and emotional regulation). Findings showed that spontaneous and voluntary future thoughts were rated similarly on all functions except the directive function, which was particularly relevant to spontaneous future thoughts. Future thoughts classed as goal-related (selected-goal-related) were rated higher across all functions, and there was largely no interaction between mode of elicitation and goal-relatedness. A higher proportion of spontaneous future thoughts were selected-goal-related compared with voluntary future thoughts. In general, these results indicate that future thinking has significant roles across affective, behavioural, self and social functions, and supports theoretical views that implicate spontaneous future thought in goaldirected cognition and behaviour.

Why We Imagine Our Future: Introducing the Functions of Future Thinking Scale (FoFTS)

“…These functions share the common feature of being task or goal-oriented, and in the service of giving rise to related, purposeful action. This is perhaps unsurprising given that a primary role of imagining the future is to address current concerns (Barsics et al, 2016;Cole & Berntsen, 2016), and that even mind-wandering has been found to frequently involve autobiographical planning (Baird, Smallwood, & Schooler, 2011;Duffy & Cole, 2020). These findings are also consistent with a previous diary study where the participants nominated 'planning actions' and 'intention-formation' as the most frequent reasons for thinking about the future (Barsics et al, 2016).…”

“…Some researchers have adopted this level of analysis through explicitly asking individuals the purpose of future thinking, and providing a limited set of options (Barsics et al, 2016;D'Argembeau et al, 2011). In other studies people are asked to imagine a series of future events and to evaluate their perceived functions using rating scales (Duffy & Cole, 2020;Özbek, Bohn, & Berntsen, 2018;Rasmussen & Berntsen, 2013). To date, however, no standardized tool has been evaluated to assess individual variation in why people engage in future thinking.…”

Spontaneous and deliberate future thinking: a dual process account

“…We call on other researchers to explore different functions, and specifically compare functions of voluntary and spontaneous future thought in single studies. We note the current dearth of such research (although see Duffy & Cole, 2019). But in this position paper, our focus remains on the relevance of spontaneous future thinking to goal-oriented cognition and behaviour, which coheres with several well-established theoretical accounts (e.g., Klinger, 2013, see below).…”

Inducing positive involuntary mental imagery in everyday life: an experimental investigation

“…Although deliberate (instructed) generation of standardized imagery scenes may allow a more controlled investigation of the impact of imagery generation on factors such as mood (e.g., ), decision-making (e.g., Gaesser & Schacter, 2014), or behaviour (e.g., Pictet et al, 2011Renner et al, 2019), we need to be cautious about extrapolating from this to involuntary, spontaneously occurring imagery, particularly as there is some evidence that involuntary mental imagery may differ in its emotional impact and other phenomenological characteristics compared to its voluntarily generated counterparts (e.g., Barsics et al, 2016;Berntsen & Hall, 2004;Cole et al, 2016), and this is a matter of ongoing debate (e.g., Barzykowski et al, 2019;Barzykowski & Niedźwieńska, 2018;Barzykowski & Staugaard, 2016Schlagman & Kvavilashvili, 2008). In fact aside from participants' subjective reports (e.g., Barsics et al, 2016;D'Argembeau et al, 2011;Duffy & Cole, 2020;Rasmussen & Berntsen, 2013) we have very little, if any, direct evidence as to the functions and impact PREPRINT OF UNPUBLISHED MANUSCRIPT: see https://osf.io/whk2b/ v4.0 02. 07.20 of what seems to be one of the most commonly-experienced forms of mental imagery.…”